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The Close Corporation Under
Kentucky Law
By WmnBuRT D.

HAm*

During the present century the tendency in corporation law,
for the most part, has been to concentrate attention on the
problems of the public issue corporation rather than on those of
the closely held corporation. Much has been written as to the
need for further legislation at both the federal and state level
that would encourage greater participation by shareholders in
the affairs of the public issue corporation, thereby promoting
greater "corporate democracy."' This interest in the public issue
corporation is understandable when one considers the tremendous
impact that such corporations have on our economy and our way
of life.2 The sheer size of these corporations and the magnitude
of their operations give to them a prominence which tends to
obscure the fact that many small closely held business enterprises
operate within the corporate framework and the fact that these
close corporations also play a significant role in the functioning
of our economic system. 3 As one commentator has pointed out,
"the close corporation is probably the most prevalent form of
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S., LL.B., University of
Illinois;
LL.M., Harvard University.
1
See, e.g., Emerson & Latcham, Shareholder Democracy (1954); Gilbert,
Dividends and Democracy (1956); Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors:
A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 Va. L. Rev. 141 (1953). But see
Garrett, Attitudes on CorporateDemocracy-A CriticalAnalysis, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev.
310 (1956).
( 2 See, e.g., Berle & Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property
932); Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (1955); Mason, The
Corporation in Modem Society (1960).
a While it is perhaps customary to think of the close corporation as involving
a relatively small business enterprise and while that is the emphasis intended in the
present article, close corporations are by no means always small enterprises. The
Ford Motor Company, which until recent years was a family-owned corporation,
provides a good example of the close corporation operating in the field of "big
business." See Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus.
Law. 741, 742 (1958).
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business entity in use in the United States," 4 and "it is probably
the only form of corporation with which a large proportion of
lawyers are familiar."5
Recently, the legal profession has shown a growing interest
in the closely held corporation and a considerable number of
articles,( as well as a two-volume tratise,7 have been written
dealing with the problems of such corporations. This recent
literature has made it evident that in the past courts and legislatures have not always given sufficient consideration to the
peculiarities of the close corporation to enable the participating
shareholders in these corporations to adapt the corporate form to
the needs of their business venture.
The close corporation is characterized by its limited membership, restricted trading in stock, and identity of ownership and
management.8 These attributes indicate that the aims of the
participants in such a corporation are likely to be quite different
from those of the typical investor in the public issue corporation,
whose primary objective usually is to find a suitable source of
investment for his funds without the need for active participation
on his part in the management of the enterprise.
The one-man company represents the close corporation in its
most extreme form. Moreover, the one-man company, by its very
nature, gives rise to problems that are not always identical with
those of the company which has several participants, all of whom
may take an active part in the enterprise. Therefore, the legal
status of the one-man company under Kentucky law will be
examined first, after which consideration will be given to the close
corporation with two or more active members.
4 Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. Law.
741 (1958).
5 Id. at 741-42.

6 See, e.g., Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1532 (1960); Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the IncorporatedPartnership,

18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 435 (1953); Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the
Closely Held Corporation,59 Yale L.J. 1040 (1950); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 Cornell L.Q. 488 (1948); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close
Corporation:Norms Versus Needs, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 483 (1958); SymposiumThe Close Corporation,52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 345 (1957).
7 O'Neal, Close Corporations: Law and Practice (2 vols. 1958).
8 For a more complete discussion of the attributes of the close corporation,
see 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.07 (1958). One writer has observed that
"no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears ever to have
been worked out." Israels, supra note 6, at 491.

CLOSE CORPORATON UNDER KENTUcKY LAw

THE ON-MAN COMPANY

The one-man company has generally received judicial approval
in this country, 9 although the real owner of the business has
frequently found it necessary to make use of "dummy" incorporators, "dummy" directors, and even "dummy" associates, to enable
him to comply with the technical requirements of the applicable
corporation statute. 10
Most states still retain the requirement of a minimum of three
incorporators who must sign and acknowledge the articles of
incorporation.11 Most states likewise still retain the requirement
that the corporation be managed by a board of directors of at
least three persons elected by the shareholders.' 2 While these
requirements are now viewed by many as useless formalities in
the creation and operation of the one-man company, 3 the requirements must nevertheless be met if the organization of even these
corporations is to be perfected according to law.
Furthermore, unexpected risks may lurk in a disregard of
organizational formalities. For example, the Kentucky general
corporation statute 4 provides that no corporation shall incur any
debts or begin the transaction of any business (except such as is
incidental to its organization) until, among other things, the first
board of directors has been elected by the shareholders, 5 and
1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.05, at 6 (1958).
'0 See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1375 (1938). For a case in which the court
recognized the use of "dummy" incorporators, see State v. Miner, 233 Mo. 312,
135 S.W. 483 (1911). But see Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, 19 N.E.
342 (1889), where a statute required five "associates" and the court held that
use of four nominal associates, along with other organizational defects, resulted
in no corporation being formed.
11 See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 135 (1959).
12 Id. § 133.
'3 See, e.g., Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432, 443 (1956). In 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 135, at 163 (1959), the author observes that "no purpose
is now served by the requirement of multiple incorporators-a relic from the
concept that a corporation is the product of a number of persons associating for
some common object."
14 Ky. Rev. Stat. H§ 271.005-.990 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as KCRS].
The present general corporation statute was adopted in 1946. Ky. Acts 1946, ch.
141. It is stated broadly in this statute that "this chapter shall apply to any
corporation formed under the laws of this state unless eiter the statutes relating
to a corporation of that kind are inconsistent with this chapter or state that the
provisions of this chapter do not apply to it." KRS 271.015.
15 KRS 271.095(1) (c). This provision relates to KRS 271.345, which provides
that "the business of every corporation shall be managed by a board of at least
three directors" and which makes further provision for the election of the first
9

(Footnote continued on next page)
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provides further that, if a corporation has transacted any business
in violation of this provision, the officers who participated in such
business and the directors who failed to indicate their dissent are
to be treated as severally liable for any resulting debts or
liabilities of the corporation.' 6 While the reference to directors
in this context seems inappropriate since no directors will have
yet been elected and while the reference to officers is ambiguous
since technically there are no officers until they are elected by
the board of directors or otherwise selected as permitted by the
corporation statute,37 nevertheless the intent of the statute clearly
seems to be to reach at least the active parties who are responsible
for the forbidden business transactions. 8 In the one-man company the owner ordinarily expects to be the dominant party.
Accordingly, the desired immunity from personal liability sought
by him through incorporation could possibly be lost if this
organizational formality of electing the first board of directors is
disregarded." 0
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

board of directors by the shareholders at their first meeting. KRS 271.035(1) (i)
requires the articles of incorporation to state the number of directors to be elected
at this first meeting.
16 KRS 271.095(2).
178 KRS 271.355.
' This unfortunate hiatus in the Kentucky statute may have resulted from
this provision having been taken from an identical provision which appears in
§ 8 of the Uniform (Model) Business Corporation Act, promulgated in 1928
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but
which does not present the same difculty due to a requirement contained in
§ 3 of the Uniform Act that the articles of incorporation name the first board
of directors. See 9 U.L.A. 115, 124 (1957). Under the Kentucky statute
the first board of directors must be elected by the shareholders at their first
meeting. See note 15 supra. In Ohio, which likewise does not require the first
board of directors to be named in the articles, liability for nonpayment of the
initial stated capital before a corporation commences business is extended to the
incorporators participating in such business before the election of directors as well
as to the directors participating therein. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.12 (Page's
Supp. 1960). Similar liability is imposed in Arkansas on "directors and shareholders," and in Georgia on "persons who organize a corporation and transact
business." 6 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-607 (repl. vol. 1957); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1872
(Supp. 1958). See generally 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 51 (1960).
Although Kentucky is listed as one of the states which has adopted a corporation statute based on the Uniform Act, nevertheless the statute so adopted contains
numerous variations from the provisions of the Uniform Act. See 9 U.L.A. 117
(1957). In Lebus v. Stansifur, 154 Ky. 444, 449, 157 S.W. 727, 729 (1913), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals observed with reference to a section contained in a
former corporation statute which provided for directors to be elected at a meeting
held before the corporation commenced business that "evidently the Legislature
had in view when it enacted that section the idea of preventing the incorporators
from getting the initial control of corporations at the inception of their organization
contrary to the wishes of a majority of the stockholders.
29 Even though the one-man company has been properly organized, the
(Footnote continued on next page)
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The recent Kentucky case of Tri-State Developers, Inc. v.
Moore2 O serves as a warning that the possibility of personal
liability on the part of those who act on behalf of a Kentucky
corporation before the conditions precedent to beginning business
have been complied with is a real and not a fanciful one. In that

case a Kentucky corporation had transacted business despite the
fact that the minimum amount of capital with which it was to

begin business had not been fully paid in as required by the
Kentucky corporation statute.2- The court held that the president
of the corporation, who was one of its organizers and one of its
directors, could be charged with personal liability for damages
resulting from breach of a corporate contract. The court con-

sidered but rejected the possibility that since no stock had been
issued at the time meetings were held to elect the officers and
directors of the corporation, the president never actually became
an officer (or director) so as to be liable under the Kentucky
statute. The court said that "those who purport to act for a
corporation before its governing body is legally constituted must

be held its de facto officers for the simple reason that otherwise
they could act indefinitely with complete impunity, without ever
meeting the" conditions precedent required by the statute for
beginning business.22
Kentucky is one of a small group of states which today
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

privilege of limited liability may also be lost if the sole shareholder fails to provide
e company with adequate capital and conducts the business as though it were
his individual business. See, e.g., Dixie Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221
Ala. 381, 128 So. 799 (1930). These are familiar grounds for disregarding the
corporate entity or piercing the corporate veil" and are not peculiar to the oneman company. However, the complete dominion which the sole shareholder has
over his company presents such unusual opportunities for abuse that, as one writer
has remarked, "the principle that corporate personality will be sustained only so
long as it is invoked for legitimate purposes has particular application to the oneman company." Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473, 482-83 (1953). For recent
Kentucky cases illustrating the application of this principle to closely held corporations, see Martin v. Ratliff Furniture Co., 264 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1954); Veterans
Serv. Club v. Sweeney, 252 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1952). In Charles Zubik & Sons, Inc.
v. Marine Sales & Serv. 300 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1957), involving the question of
corporate liabili r, the court referred to the situation as one in which an individual
business owner 'in the management of his business affairs, had a persistent habit
of switching interchangeably, back and forth, from an individual to a corporate
capacity."
203 43 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).
21 KBS 271.095(l)(b).
22 843 S.W.2d at 816.
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specifically grants permission for one person to incorporate, 23 but
such permission has existed in Kentucky only since 1954, when
the present general corporation statute was amended so as to
provide for a single incorporator.2 4 While the present Kentucky
corporation statute thus clarifies the inherent validity of the oneman company by permitting one person to "form" a corporation,
the statute does not eliminate the necessity for such an incorporator-owner to comply with the other organizational formalities
prescribed by the statute.
The 1954 amendment had particular significance in view of
statements made by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case
of Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman,"5 indicating that one
person could not organize a corporation under the then existing
general incorporation statute which provided that "any number
of persons may associate themselves together and become in26
In the
corporated for the transaction of any lawful business."1
course of its opinion, the court said that "there is no such being
in this State as a sole corporation, and certainly none such allowed
to be created by the statute." 7 The 1954 amendment obviously
makes this statement obsolete. Moreover, the amendment probably affects the Eisenman case in still another respect. In the
Eisenman case the court was not concerned with an attempt by
one person to organize a corporation but rather with the purchase
of all the corporation's stock by one of the original incorporators
in a corporation which had been properly created. The court
took the position that such a purchase had the effect of suspending
the corporate franchise until the stock was transferred to other
persons.28 By giving statutory recognition to the one-man com23 KRS 271.025. In addition to Kentucky, the only other states at present are
Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See I Iowa Code § 491.2 (1958) (old Iowa
general corporation statute); Iowa Business Corporation Act § 48 (effective July 4,
1959), 2 P-H Corp. Serv., Iowa ff 235 (1959); 5A Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.3
(Mason's Supp. 1956); 1 Wis. Stat. § 180.44 (1959). New York likewise will
require only one incorporator when its new Business Corporation Law becomes
effective on April 1, 1963. See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Ap1961 Pocket Parts, at 87).
pendix,
2
4 Ky. Acts 1954, ch. 33.
2594 Ky. 83, 21 S.W. 531 (1893).
26
Ky. Acts 1869, ch. 729, § 1.
27 94 Ky. at 89, 21 S.W. at 532.
28 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, has not construed the "suspension" doctrine as involving a complete merger of the identity of the corporation with the sole owner. In the Eisenman case itself the court held that it did
not follow from suspension of the corporate franchise that the individual property

(Footnote continued on next page)
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party, Kentucky has eliminated the need for continued reference
to the "suspension" doctrine by the courts of this state.29
An unfortunate oversight occurred, however, in connection
with the 1954 amendment which needs to be corrected. It
pertains to the section of the corporation statute dealing with
the filing and recording of the articles of incorporation. This
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of the sole owner thereby becomes liable for a debt contracted by him on behalf
of the corporation when no fraud was practiced by him on the creditor and the
creditor extended the entire credit to the corporation, since the creditor gets all
he bargained for when he subjects the corporate property to the payment of his
debt. Later, in Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703 (1934),
the court, while recognizing the "suspension" doctrine, held that it was error in
an attachment proceeding to sell a corporation's real estate as the property of its
sole owner since corporate debts take precedence over the individual debts of the
owner and the only interest which such owner has in the assets of the corporation
is an equity after paying the debts of the corporation. For other Kentucky
decisions referring to the "suspension" doctrine, see Russell Lumber & Supply Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 262 Ky. 888, 90 S.W.2d 372 (1936); Kentucky Harlan Coal
Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53 S.W. 538 (1932); Geo. T. Stagg Co.
v. E. H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 113 Ky. 709, 68 S.W. 862 (1902); Louisville Gas Co.
v. Kaufman, 105 Ky. 131, 48 S.W. 434 (1898).
29 Until recently the "suspension doctrine found one of its most frequent
expressions in the Kentucky cases, but in 1956 it broke forth with surprising vigor
in a North Carolina decision which provoked considerable alarm in that state. See
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955),
on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). In that case the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, on rehearing, held that the purchaser of all the stock in
a corporation became a necessary party plaintiff in a suit brought by the
corporation for breach of contract since as such purchaser he became at least the
owner The
of the
corporate
any recovery would be for his
equitable
use and benefit.
court
said (91property
S.E.2d atand
586):
When one person acquires all the stock of a corporation, what then is the
status of the cororation and the property held in its name? We are of the
opinion and so hold that the corporation becomes dormant or inactive and
exists only for the purpose of holding legal title of the property for the use
and benefit of the single stockholder who becomes seized of the beneficial
title to the property. Not possessing the managerial agencies-stockholders,
directors, or olcers,-contemplated by statute, it can no longer act as a
corporation. Its decisions are the decisions of the single stockholder, and its
action is his action.
For comments on this case and its implications, see Latty, A Conceptualistic
Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation,34 N.C.L. Rev. 471 (1956); Latty,
The Close Corporationand the New North Carolina Business CorporationAct, 34
N.C.L. Rev. 432, 441-44 (1956).
In 1957 the North Carolina legislature responded to the Park Terrace
decision with curative legislation designed to remove the concept of "dormancy"
resulting from acquisition of all the stock in a corporation by less than three
persons, even if such acquisition had already occurred. See 2B N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-3.1(d)(repl. vol. 1960). But in Lester Bros., Inc. v. Pope Realty & Ins.
Co., 250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959), the court imposed partnership liability
for corporate debts upon two shareholders who had acquired all of the stock in
the corporation, holding that at the time the indebtedness was incurred in 1955
the creditor had a vested right in that liability under the law of North Carolina
as declared in the Park Terrace decision which the legislature could not take
away by retroactive legislation without violating the obligation of contract. The
possibility of the retroactive aspects of this curative legislation meeting difficulty
was foreshadowed in Comments on North Carolina1957 Session Laws, 36 N.C.L.
Rev. 41, 48 (1957).
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section provides that the articles of incorporation shall be acknowledged "by at least three of the incorporators" before
delivery to the Secretary of State.30 If the intent of the 1954
amendment permitting one person to "form" a corporation was to
permit that person to become the sole incorporator, as seems
clearly to have been the case, then it is wholly inconsistent to
continue the requirement of acknowledgment by three incorpora-

tors in such a case.3 ' While this appears to have been merely a
technical oversight, its correction would eliminate any residual
doubt as to the propriety of one person acting as the sole incorporator of a Kentucky corporation.
At the time of the Eisenman case it was customary for corporation statutes to require that directors hold stock in the corporation,3 2 a requirement that further complicated the concept of the
one-man corporation. Although the present Kentucky corporation
statute does not require directors to be shareholders unless the
articles of incorporation so require,33 there is nothing in the
present statute which suggests that the use of a board of directors
can be completely by-passed.3 4 The use of "dummy" directors
may be a satisfactory, or at least an acceptable, answer in many,
perhaps most, instances. Yet it is possible that a sole shareholder
30 KRS 271.045. (Emphasis added.)
31

The Attorney General of Kentucky issued an opinion on February 27, 1959,
to the effect that, since KRS 271.025 permits one person to incorporate, in such
a case the articles of incorporation need be acknowledged by only the one incorporator. Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 42,873.
32 See Stevens, Private Corporations § 158, at 735-36 (2d ed. 1949). The
courts, however, did not take this requirement of stock ownership too seriously.
For example, prior to 1946, at a time when the Kentucky corporation statute
required that a director own in his own right at least three shares of its capital
stock, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Kaye v. Kentucky Pub. Elevator Co.,
295 Ky. 661, 175 S.W.2d 142 (1943), held that three directors of a corporation
to whom it was alleged stock had been transferred for the sole purpose of
qualifying them as directors were not thereby disqualified from acting as directors.
The court said that "the general rule is that a director may hold his stock as a
trustee, or have only the legal title thereto, even for the express and sole purpose
of making him eligible unless the situation was brought about in furtherance of a
dishonest or fraudulent scheme concerning the management or control of the
company." Id. at 665, 175 S.W.2d at 144.
33 KRS 271.345(1).
34 On March 8, 1961, the Attorney General of Kentucky issued an opinion
in which he took the position that KRS 271.025, which permits incorporation by
one person, does not have the effect of repealing by implication other sections
of the general corporation statute requiring acts to be performed by more than
one person. Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 61,206. This opinion specifically overruled an
earlier opinion, issued on May 24, 1955, which had indicated that KRS 271.345,
pertaining to a board of directors, was nullified "when a corporation has been
chartered under KRS 271.025 or where all the shares of stock of a corporation
have been subsequently acquired by one person." Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 36,090.
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could find himself faced with a real problem as to "control' if the
two "dummy" directors should suddenly turn against his wishes
before their terms of office expired. The suggestion has been
made that in most jurisdictions this problem could be solved by a
charter or bylaw provision giving to the sole shareholder the
power to remove directors at any time with or without cause."5
It may be asked, however, why the sole shareholder should not be
allowed to accomplish directly what this procedure would allow
him to accomplish indirectly, namely, the complete and unrestrained control over corporate affairs.
It has been convincingly argued that there is nothing inherent
in the nature of corporate existence which requires the use of a
multi-membership board of directors .3 The practical necessity

for delegating managerial responsibility to a small group in the
case of corporations with many shareholders probably best explains the use of a board of directors and the recognition of such
a board as an attribute of corporateness when general corporation
statutes were first formulated. 7 Since no such practical necessity
exists in the case of the one-man company, it seems only fair and
reasonable that in jurisdictions such as Kentucky which authorize
incorporation by one person, authorization should likewise be
given for dispensing with the customary three-man board.3 This
35 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.13 (1958). The North Carolina Business
Corporation Act meets this problem by specifically providing that majority shareholders can remove the entire board or any individual director, with or without
cause, unless the articles or bylaws otherwise provide. 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-27
(f)(repl. vol. 1960). See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North
CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432, 444 (1956).
36 See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A
Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696, 702-14 (1960).
Nevertheless,
37 See Stevens, Private Corporations § 143 (2d ed. 1949).
expressions can sometimes be found which suggest that a board of directors is
indispensable to corporate existence. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 81
S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944), in which the court said, "A private business corporation
without a board of directors is an impossible concept." Statements such as this
seem extreme and unwarranted.
88 Iowa has done this recently as to corporations formed under the new Iowa
Business Corporation Act. Section 34 of that act as adopted in 1959 provided that
"the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of
directors." By an amendment to § 34 effective Tuly 4, 1961, it is specifically made
clear that the board of directors may consist of "one or more' persons. See
1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull. Vol. XXX-No. 26, June 21, 1961, 11 26.3;
2 P-H Corp. Serv., Iowa 11226 (1961). Under the "old" Iowa general corporation
statute, which is still available for incorporation of Iowa corporations, there is no
specific statutory requirement that a corporation have a board of directors. It
appears therefore that the shareholders could dispense entirely with the use of a
board of directors under that statute. See Kessler, supra note 36, at 726. See also
Hayes, Stockholders' Rights in the Iowa Corporation, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 459, 468
(1955).

[Vol. 50,
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would at least permit a one-man corporation to be organized with
a one-man board consisting of the sole shareholder. No doubt
such jurisdictions could justifiably take the additional step of
permitting the sole incorporator to dispense entirely with the use
of a board of directors as unnecessary to the structure and functioning of the one-man company. As Justice Rutledge once said
with regard to legislation on the subject of one-man companies:
This should involve not only direct and simple authority for
a single individual to incorporate, but also provision for
direct control of the incorporated enterprise by the individual whose business is incorporated. Every laborer knows
that John Doe is "boss" of John Doe, Incorporated. The
law should not be blind to such an elementary "fact of life"
in the corporate world. Nor should it create the opportunity,
which occasionally is seized, for a mere "dummy" to decide
the future of another man's business in a manner contrary
to that man's interests and desires. 9
TBm Mur=L
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1. Distributionof control-In general.
When one turns from the one-man company to the close
corporation composed of two, three, four, or more participants,
he finds that the legal problems thereby generated tend to change
complexion, particularly in the area of control and management.
Whereas in the one-man company ownership and control coincide
in the sole owner, in the company composed of several participants control normally vests in the participants who own a
majority of the stock. It is they who have the power to elect all
or at least a majority of the board of directors. For this reason
participants holding a minority interest may seek some means of
securing an opportunity for participation in corporate affairs.
When considering the distribution of control in these multipleownership companies, it must be kept in mind that control
operates at both the shareholder level and the director level.
Although the general management of corporate business affairs
is vested in a board of directors, 40 there are certain matters of a
3 Rutledge,
Significant Trends in Modem Incorporation Statutes, 22 Wash.
U.L.Q.
305, 339 (1937).
40 It
has been held that decisions of the board of directors are
not subject to
interference by a mere majority of the shareholders. Automatic Self-Cleansing
(Footnote continued on next page)
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fundamental nature relating to the structure and operation of the
enterprise which modem corporation statutes generally recognize
as within the ambit of shareholder action. These include such
matters as amendment of the articles of incorporation, 41 dissolution,42 sale of all the assets of the business, 43 and merger or consolidation. 44 Some of these matters, such as merger and consolidation, relate primarily to the affairs of the public issue corporation,
but others, particularly those concerning amendment of the articles of incorporation and dissolution, can touch the affairs of the
close corporation with as much frequency as those of the public
issue corporation. Accordingly, the participants in the close
corporation must evaluate their needs with regard to control both
in their capacities as shareholders and also in their capacities as
directors.
In addition to recognizing the two-level nature of control, it is
also necessary to realize that some of the legal devices available
to the participants in the close corporation through which they
can distribute control operate within the framework of the
corporate structure itself while other such devices operate outside
the corporate framework and that a careful evaluation of the
relative merits of these alternative devices must be made to
determine which of them will best serve the needs of the participants from both a business and a legal standpoint. In the
discussion which follows attempt will be made to present some
of the specific control problems which face the participants in the
multiple-ownership company and to evaluate control devices
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 84 (C.A.). In Manufacturers'
Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 121 Ky. 403, 406, 89 S.W. 248, 249 (1905),
the court observed: "The judgment or discretion of the governing body, usually a
board of directors, as to matters intra vires, is entirely beyond the control of the
stockholders through the intervention of the courts, except for frauds committed
or threatened against the corporation or the minority stockholders." However, if
all the shareholders in a corporation agree that certain action should be taken, it
is arguable that their voice should control over that of the board of directors. As
Professor Ballantine has pointed out. "the right to have the affairs of the
corporation managed by the board of directors is a right of each shareholder
derived from the statute under which the company is formed." Therefore, as he
says, "if the real parties in interest unanimously agree on lawful corporate acts,
their voice should control." Ballantine, Corporations § 43, at 123 (rev. ed. 1946).
A similar viewpoint has been expressed by Dean Stevens. See Stevens, Private
Corporations
§ 143, at 651-53 (2d ed. 1949).
4
'KRS 271.445.
42 KRS 271.500.
43 MKS 271.415.
44 KRS 271.470.
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which have been used to meet those problems in particular
relation to the law in Kentucky.
2. Cumulative voting.
If the main concern of each participant in the multiple-ownership company is that he be assured of representation on the board
of directors, he may find that this assurance, in Kentucky at least,
can be established through resort to the cumulative voting privilege, which is guaranteed to shareholders in Kentucky corporations by constitutional provision.45 Under this privilege a shareholder possessing one vote for each share of stock owned by him
(the usual situation) may concentrate his total number of votes
on one or more candidates of his choice instead of being required
to cast his votes on a single candidate for each director position
to be filled. The usefulness of this privilege to the individual
shareholder will depend, of course, on the total number of voting
shares he owns in relation to the number of directors on the board.
In a three-man corporation with a board of directors of three
persons, in which the shares of stock are divided equally among
the three shareholder-owners, any one of the shareholders through
use of cumulative voting could be assured of electing at least one
director. On the other hand, if there are five shareholders who
own equal interests in the stock of the corporation, one shareholder alone could not by means of cumulative voting elect one
of the directors on a three-man board.46
45

Ky. Const. § 207. The provision reads:
In all elections for directors or managers of any corporation, each shareholder shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggre ate as he shall
be entitled to vote in said company under its charter, multiplied by the
number of directors or managers to be elected at such election; and each
shareholder may cast the whole number of votes, either in person or by
proxy, for one candidate, or distribute such votes among two or more
candidates, and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
manner.
A similar provision appears in the Kentucky corporation statute. See KRS
271.315(2). Kentucky is one of thirteen states that makes cumulative voting
mandatory by constitutional provision. The other states are Arizona, Idaho, Illinois,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Ten additional states, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming, provide for mandatory cumulative voting in their corporation
statutes. See 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 522, 524 (1960).
46 For discussion of the mathematics of cumulative voting, see Cole, The Legal
and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950). For a
good review of the history and functioning of cumulative voting in American
corporations, both large and small, see Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors
(1951).
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Furthermore, even in those instances in which the cumulative
voting privilege would mathematically assure the individual shareholder of representation on the board, he must be alert to certain
maneuvers which can sometimes be used to weaken or destroy
the effectiveness of his right. One of these consists in reducing
the total number of directors, thereby increasing the total number
of shares it takes to elect one director; 47 another consists in classifying the board of directors so that only a portion of the board is
elected in any one year.48 Both of these maneuvers it appears
could be effectively thwarted by the shareholders in a Kentucky
corporation through provisions in the articles of incorporation (or
bylaws) setting up a requirement of unanimous consent of the
shareholders for any changes in the total number of directors or
in their terms of office.49
As to the classification procedure, it would probably be unwise
to assume that the provision in the Kentucky corporation statute
47
See, e.g., KRS 271.345(4), which provides that the number of directors
may be prescribed by the articles of incorporation or bylaws. A majority of the
shareholders could, therefore, by amendment of the articles or bylaws change
the number of directors as originally fixed. Some of the states with mandatory
cumulative voting provisions have built into their corporation statutes a means of
preventing a majority from reducing the number of directors to the detriment of
the minority. The Michigan General Corporation Act, for example, provides that
the number of directors cannot be reduced if a sufficient number of votes are
recorded against such reduction which, if cumulatively voted, would elect one or
more directors and if, after the reduction, these same votes, could not cumulatively
elect the same number of directors as before the reduction. 5A Mich. Comp. Laws
(Mason's Supp. 1956).
§ 450.13
48
See, e.g., KRS 271.345(4) which provides that "directors shall be elected
for terms of one year, except that it may be provided by the articles or bylaws, or
by a vote of the shareholders, that the directors be elected for terms of two years
or three years, in which case the terms shall be so arranged that the terms of an
equal or nearly equal number of directors will expire each year."
49 Unanimous consent for amendment of the articles of incorporation would
seem to be clearly authorized by KRS 271.445(2), which permits an increase in
the voting requirement for amending the articles above the usual majority vote.
Unanimous consent for changes in the bylaws would seem to be authorized by
KRS 271.315(7), which provides broadly that the articles or the bylaws may
specify the votes that shall be necessary for the transaction of any business, except
where restricted by the corporation statute itself. KRS 271.285, the section of
the statute devoted to the bylaw-making power, contains no restrictions as to the
number of votes needed to amend the bylaws. As said by the New York Court of
Appeals in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829, 832 (1945),
which involved, among other things, an attempt by shareholders in a close
corporation to require unanimous consent for amendment of the bylaws:
Every corporation is empowered to make by-laws . ..and by-laws of some
sort or other are usually considered to be essential to the organization of a
corporation .... The State has an interest in seeing to it that such "private
laws" or by-laws as the corporation adopts are not inconsistent with the public
law and not such as will turn the corporation into some other kind of entity.
But, once proper by-laws have been adopted, the matter of amending them is,
we think, no concern of the State.
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authorizing the staggering of the terms of office of the board of
directors would meet the same fate that befell a similar provision
in the Illinois Business Corporation Act when the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in the well-known case of Wolfson v. Avery, 50 declared
such provision unconstitutional as incompatible with the section
of the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing shareholders in Illinois
corporations the right to vote cumulatively in the election of
directors. The Illinois court relied heavily on the debates of the
Illinois constitutional convention at which the provision was
adopted and the contemporaneous comments in the public press
as indicating a purpose to afford the minority protection in
proportion to its voting strength.r1 However, the debates of the
constitutional convention at which the Kentucky provision was
adopted do not carry the same persuasive implications as to
purpose. 52 These debates reveal that the effect of failure to elect
the entire board at one time was actually considered in the
adoption of the Kentucky constitutional provision and a suggestion made but rejected that language be used requiring that all
3
directors (or at least one-half) be voted upon at one time.r

The inference which one writer has derived from the failure of
this suggestion to be adopted is that the delegates were apparently
willing to accept classification as compatible with cumulative
54

voting.

It appears, therefore, that the minority shareholder in Kentucky can best insulate himself against the possible adverse effects
of the classification procedure by insisting on a built-in protection
in the form of a provision in the articles of incorporation (or bylaws) requiring unanimous approval for adoption of any proposals
50 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
51 126 N.E.2d at 707-10.
52 3 Proceedings and Debates in the Convention, Kentucky 3732-87 (1890).
Actually, there seems to be some question whether even the debates at the Illinois
constitutional convention carried the strong implications as to purpose stressed by
the court in Wolfson v. Avery. In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Hershey
questioned the interpretation as to purpose which the majority of the court had
derived from resort to extrinsic aids and urged that a proper analysis of the
constitutional provision demonstrated that the statutory classification procedure
was not unconstitutional. Commentators have likewise found similar objections to
the majority opinion. See, e.g., Sell & Fuge, Impact of Classified Corporate
Directorateson the ConstitutionalRight of Cumulative Voting, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
151 (1956).
53 3 Proceedings and Debates in the Convention, Kentucky 3732-85 (1890).

54 Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction and Classification of
CorporateBoards, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 758 (1955).
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to change the terms of directors.5 5 The disastrous consequences
which can result to an individual shareholder who fails to require
such a provision are vividly illustrated by a recent Ohio case'
in which the articles of incorporation of a closely held corporation

had been amended so as to provide three-year terms for the threeman board, with their terms so staggered that only one director
would be elected at each annual meeting. The effect of this

action, upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio, was to deprive one
of the shareholders, who owned forty per cent of the company's
stock, from securing representation on the board of directors
through use of the cumulative voting privilege given to him by
the Ohio corporation statute. 5 The 1955 revision of the Ohio
General Corporation Law has eliminated the possibility of such
an extreme maneuver in the future by providing that each class
55 See note 49 supra.

SO Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 183 N.E.2d 780 (1956).
57
When this case came before the intermediate appellate court of Ohio for
decision, the court held that the resolution amending the articles of incorporation
so as to classify the three member board into three classes was invalid since it
could not be assumed that the authority granted by the corporation statute to
classify the board of directors was intended to permit complete nullification of the
right of a shareholder to cumulate his vote, a right which had been recognized
in the corporation statute long before the privilege of classification was granted.
Humphrys v. Winous Co., 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955). In reversing,
the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the statutory provision for cumulative
voting as guaranteeing to minority shareholders only the right of cumulative
voting and not as necessarily guaranteeing the effectiveness of the exercise of that
right. Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780, 789 (1956).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a similar position as to a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to vote cumulatively in Janney v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956). In this case the
Pennsylvania court said (128 A.2d at 80):
All that the Constitution provides is that each stockholder should have the
right to concentrate his votes on one or more candidates to be chosen in any
given election; that right is undisputed, but as to how many candidates there
shall be at the election, whether they must consist of all the directors of the
corporation, whether they cannot be classified and their elections staggered,
-as to these and many other factors which necessarily enter into each
situation the Constitution is wholly silent; to write into it any such limiting or
qualifying provisons as contended for by plantiff would be an extreme exercise
of judicial legislation.
The Pennsylvania court sought to distinguish the Illinois case of Wolfson v.
Averyl on the technical ground that the Pennsylvania constitutional provision is
framed in terms of each shareholder having as many votes as the number of
candidates whereas the Illinois constitutional provision is framed in terms of the
number of directors. However, this distinction based on the choice of language is
not altogether persuasive. See Sell & Fuge, supra note 52, at 172-74.
Other recent cases in states having mandatory cumulative voting provisions
include Bohannan v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957)
(provision for classified board in articles of incorporation held to be permissible),
and State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958)
(provision for classified board in bylaws held to be incompatible with constitutional
provision).
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in the case of a classified board must consist of not less than three
directors. 8
In addition to charter or bylaw provisions which bar reduction
in the number of directors and which preclude use of the
classification procedure, a minority interest may also need to
guard against the possible ability of the majority to remove
directors elected by the minority, thereby creating vacancies
which could be filled by the majority despite the presence of
the cumulative voting privilege. Shareholders are considered as
having an inherent power to remove a director for cause,59 and
statutes now exist in a number of states granting to shareholders
the power of removal without cause.60 Furthermore, even in the
absence of such statutes, it appears that a corporation may adopt
charter or bylaw provisions for the removal of directors without
cause.61 Exercise of this power of removal could, of course,
effectively nullify the cumulative voting privilege, particularly if
the removal can be accomplished without cause.62 To overcome
this threat some states have adopted statutory provisions which
prohibit the removal of any individual director if the votes of a
sufficient number of shares are voted against his removal which,
if cumulatively voted, would be sufficient to elect at least one
director.6 3 Since Kentucky has no such statutory provision, a
minority group interested in protecting its cumulative voting
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.57 (Page's Supp. 1960).
59 Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
60 See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 389 (1959).
61See Ballantine, Corporations § 185, at 434 (rev. ed. 1946); Stevens,
Private Corporations § 163, at 764 (2d ed. 1949).
62Once removal has been accomplished, the corporation statute in Kentucky
tends to favor the majority. KRS 271.345(4) (a) provides that vacancies in the
board of directors are to be filled by the remaining members of the board,
except as otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws. Such persons hold office
until their successors are elected by the shareholders, which may be at the next
annual meeting or at a special meeting called for such purpose.
63 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 810 (Deering 1953); 2B N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-27(f)(repl. vol. 1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.58(C) (Page's Supp.
1960). In jurisdictions which do not have such a statutory provision it has been
suggested that courts could forestall arbitrary use of the removal power by the
majority to defeat the cumulative voting right by limiting the power of removal
without cause to representatives of the majority. Comment, Cumulative VotingRemoval, Reduction and Classification of Corporate Boards, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev.
751, 753 (1955). In New York, a permissive cumulative voting jurisdiction, it
has been held that an amendment of a corporate charter to provide for cumulative
voting had the effect of invalidating an existing bylaw provision which provided
for removal of a director without cause. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761,
116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
58
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privilege from this removal power may need to arrange for such
protection through appropriate clauses in the articles of incorporation or bylaws restricting the scope of the power of removal
64
which can be exercised by the majority.
This in turn raises another interesting question which' presses
in the opposite direction. Can shareholders in a corporation
organized in a mandatory cumulative voting jurisdiction, such as
Kentucky, agree not to exercise their cumulative voting privilege?
If a majority in interest were to persuade the minority to agree
to such an arrangement, would it be binding on the minority?
Two recent cases outside of Kentucky have indicated that shareholders can make such an arrangement, at least if it is done
through private agreement among themselves and not as part of
the corporate structure itself.
In the most recent of these cases, Sensabaugh v. Polson Plywood Co.,6 5 the issue arose as the result of a bylaw which a
majority of the shareholders of a Montana corporation had
adopted providing for straight voting by the shareholders. Later,
a shareholder who had approved this bylaw asserted his right to
vote cumulatively at a corporate election over the objection of the
presiding officer. The latter refused to permit any of the shareholders to vote cumulatively and counted all ballots as straight
ballots. The shareholder then brought a suit to have the election
of directors declared null and void and to have the court order
the holding of a new election. The Supreme Court of Montana
affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff shareholder on the basis that
a corporation could not through a bylaw deny the right of cumulative voting. Two of the judges, however, indicated that, in their
opinion, there was nothing in the constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative voting which would inhibit shareholders
from agreeing among themselves outside the corporate structure
to forego their right to vote cumulatively. A third judge concurred
in the result, thereby making a three-judge majority. A fourth
judge concurred on the point that a corporation could not deprive
a shareholder of his right to vote cumulatively, but dissented as to
the result reached on the ground that the bylaw provision should
64 See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.59 (1958).
65 185 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d1064 (1959).
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have been considered as a binding agreement among those who
assented to it. A fifth judge dissented from that part of the
opinion of the first two judges which had upheld the right of
shareholders to agree to give up their cumulative voting rights,
his position being that the constitutional provision voiced a public
policy of the state as to the election of directors which could not
be altered by private contract.
It is evident that at least three, and perhaps four, out of the
five judges in this Montana case were willing to concede that
shareholders could by agreement among themselves voluntarily
give up their cumulative voting right, the only difference among
the judges being the form which such agreement could take. The
two judges who wrote the dominant opinion relied heavily on the
earlier Nebraska case of E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert,6"
in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska had upheld a private
agreement that conflicted with the cumulative method of voting
guaranteed by the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska court
had taken the position that the constitutional provision was
intended to secure to minority shareholders a greater representation in corporate business affairs and to prevent involuntary loss
of the cumulative voting privilege but was not intended to deprive
a shareholder of the right to contract with respect to the voting
of his stock if he so desired.
While there appear to be no Kentucky cases directly raising
this question, in the early case of Schmidt v. Mitchell,6 7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals asserted that no shareholder was required
to vote his stock cumulatively at a corporate election unless he
so desired. From this it could perhaps be inferred that the court
would not have objected to an agreement among the shareholders
in which they had voluntarily surrendered their cumulative voting
privilege. However, there is a considerable difference between
a shareholder deciding at any given corporate election not to
avail himself of his cumulative voting privilege and a shareholder
surrendering such voting privilege as to future elections by virtue
of a shareholders' agreement. One thing the court did stress in
the Mitchell case was that no shareholder had been denied the
right to vote his stock cumulatively.
66 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
67 101 Ky. 570, 41 S.W. 929 (1897).
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3. Classificationof stock.
Another device which may prove useful in achieving the
desired end of representation on the board of directors is the
classification of shares into two or more classes with provision
for election of a designated portion of the board by each class. 8
There is ample statutory basis in Kentucky for using this approach
since the Kentucky corporation statute, like other modem corporation statutes, authorizes the use of more than one class of stock.69
However, a disadvantage which the use of this approach might
have today is its possible adverse tax effect in depriving the
corporation of eligibility to be taxed on a partnership basis under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.70 Moreover, in a
state like Illinois which has stressed proportional representation
as the purpose served by cumulative voting, there might well be
objection to any arrangement which interferes with the right of
in the election of all directors at
each shareholder to participate
71
meeting.
each annual
This latter objection could possibly be raised under Kentucky
law since the Kentucky constitutional provision on cumulative
voting reads in terms of each shareholder having the right to cast
the number of votes to which his share ownership entitles him
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected at such election.72 Even if it should be concluded that the statutory provision
authorizing classification of the board of directors is not incompatible with this provision, it would not necessarily follow that
an arrangement classifying stock so as to enable each class to
elect only a portion of the board would likewise not be incom08

See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.23 (1958).
60 KRS 271.155(1) provides: "The shares of a corporation may be divided
or more classes or one or more series within any class ... "
into one
70
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1371-77. One of the requirements for
receiving this special tax treatment is that the corporation have only one class of
stock. However, under Regulations issued by the Treasury Department, this
requirement is deemed to be met if two or more classes of stock are identical in
every respect except the right of each class to elect the number of directors
proportionate to the number of shares in that class. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g)
(1959). See Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalizationof Corporations, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 185, 189-90 (1959).
71 See People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 M. 300, 134 N.E.
707 (1922), which held that the constitutional provision on cumulative voting
prevented the use of nonvoting preferred shares. See also § 28 of the present
Illinois Business Corporation Act, which provides that "each outstanding share,
regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote on each matter submitted to a
Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.28 (1959).
vote at a meeting of shareholders." 1 Ill.
72 See note 45 supra.
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patible. Under the former arrangement the shareholder would
still be free to cumulate his votes in relation to all the directors
to be elected at any one time whereas under the latter arrangement the shareholder would be confined in his voting to a particular portion of the board to be elected. This conflicts with the
express language of the section. However, if it can be assumed
that the purpose of the cumulative voting provision in Kentucky
is merely to afford an opportunity for minority representation
rather than to assure proportional representation by minorities at
all times, then it is arguable that use of classified stock as a means
of giving each separate interest in the corporation representation
on the board should not be deemed to clash with the constitutional provision on cumulative voting. Indeed, use of classified
shares could prove to be an even more effective means than
cumulative voting for providing the desired representation on the
board by each interest if the stock is so divided among the participants that no one of them could elect a director by cumulating
his votes.73
4. Voting agreements.
Although it appears that in Kentucky the two devices just
discussed, cumulative voting and classified stock, are reasonably
reliable for achieving the desired end of assuring representation
on the board of directors, the participants in a close corporation
may sometimes prefer to make use of devices outside the
corporate framework for this purpose. Here again, two devices
appear to be most suitable-use of a simple shareholders' pooling
agreement or use of the more formal voting trust.
The shareholders' pooling agreement is one in which the
parties agree to vote their stock in the election of directors (and
perhaps in other matters) as mutually agreed upon by them.
Early courts tended to invalidate such agreements, but the prevailing attitude today is to uphold them so long as they are formed
for a proper purpose, that is, to serve corporate ends and not to
commit fraud or perpetrate wrong on other shareholders.7
73
For a discussion of certain precautions a draftsman may need to take into
account in setting up class voting, see 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.24 (1958).
74 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 5.08 (1958).
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The recent Kentucky case of Tri-State Developers, Inc. v.
Moore20 serves as a warning that the possibility of personal
liability on the part of those who act on behalf of a Kentucky
corporation before the conditions precedent to beginning business
have been complied with is a real and not a fanciful one. In that
case a Kentucky corporation had transacted business despite the
fact that the minimum amount of capital with which it was to
begin business had not been fully paid in as required by the

Kentucky corporation statute.21 The court held that the president
of the corporation, who was one of its organizers and one of its
directors, could be charged with personal liability for damages
resulting from breach of a corporate contract. The court considered but rejected the possibility that since no stock had been

issued at the time meetings were held to elect the officers and
directors of the corporation, the president never actually became
an officer (or director) so as to be liable under the Kentucky
statute. The court said that "those who purport to act for a
corporation before its governing body is legally constituted must
be held its de facto officers for the simple reason that otherwise
they could act indefinitely with complete impunity, without ever
meeting the" conditions precedent required by the statute for
beginning business.2 2
Kentucky is one of a small group of states which today
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

privilege of limited liability may also be lost if the sole shareholder fails to provide
the company with adequate capital and conducts the business as though it were
his individual business. See, e.g., Dixie Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221
Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930). These are familiar grounds for disregarding the
corporate entity or "piercing the corporate veil" and are not peculiar to the oneman company. However, the complete dominion which the sole shareholder has
as oneonly
writer
for will
abuse
such
unusual
opportunities
his company
overremarked,
so
personality
be that,
sustained
"thepresents
principle
that
corporate
has
long as it is invoked for legitimate purposes has particular application to the oneman company." Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations,18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473, 482-83 (1953). For recent
Kentucky cases illustrating the application of this principle to closely held corporations, see Martin v. Ran Furniture Co., 264 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1954); Veterans
Selv. Club v. Sweeney, 252 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1952). In Charles Zubik & Sons, Inc.
v. Marine Sales & Serv. 300 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1957), involving the question of
corporate liability, the court referred to the situation as one in which an individual
business owner 'in the management of his business affairs, had a persistent habit
of switching interchangeably, back and forth, from an individual to a corporate
capacity."
20343 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).

21 KRS 271.095(1) (b).
2 343 S.W.2d at 816.
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specifically grants permission for one person to incorporate,2 3 but
such permission has existed in Kentucky only since 1954, when
the present general corporation statute was amended so as to
provide for a single incorporator.24 While the present Kentucky
corporation statute thus clarifies the inherent validity of the oneman company by permitting one person to "form" a corporation,
the statute does not eliminate the necessity for such an incorporator-owner to comply with the other organizational formalities
prescribed by the statute.
The 1954 amendment had particular significance in view of
statements made by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case
of Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman,2 5 indicating that one
person could not organize a corporation under the then existing
general incorporation statute which provided that "any number
of persons may associate themselves together and become incorporated for the transaction of any lawful business."2" In the
course of its opinion, the court said that "there is no such being
in this State as a sole corporation, and certainly none such allowed
to be created by the statute."27 The 1954 amendment obviously
makes this statement obsolete. Moreover, the amendment probably affects the Eisenman case in still another respect. In the
Eisenman case the court was not concerned with an attempt by
one person to organize a corporation but rather with the purchase
of all the corporation's stock by one of the original incorporators
in a corporation which had been properly created. The court
took the position that such a purchase had the effect of suspending
the corporate franchise until the stock was transferred to other
persons.2" By giving statutory recognition to the one-man com23 KRS 271.025. In addition to Kentucky, the only other states at present are
Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See 1 Iowa Code § 491.2 (1958) (old Iowa

general corporation statute); Iowa Business Corporation Act § 48 (effective July 4,

1959), 2 P-H Corp. Serv., Iowa 9 235 (1959); 5A Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.3

(Mason's Supp. 1956); 1 Wis. Stat. § 180.44 (1959). New York likewise will
require only one incorporator when its new Business Corporation Law becomes

effective on April 1, 1963. See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Appendix,
24 1961 Pocket Parts, at 87).
Ky. Acts 1954, ch. 33.
2594
Ky. 83,21 S.W. 581 (1893).
26

Ky. Acts 1869, ch. 729, § 1.

27 94 Ky. at 89, 21 S.W. at 532.

28 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, has not construed the "suspension" doctrine as involving a complete merger of the identity of the corporation with the sole owner. In the Eisenman case itself the court held that it did
not follow from suspension of the corporate franchise that the individual property
(Footnote continued on next page)
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pany, Kentucky has eliminated the need for continued reference
29
to the "suspension" doctrine by the courts of this state.
An unfortunate oversight occurred, however, in connection
with the 1954 amendment which needs to be corrected. It
pertains to the section of the corporation statute dealing with
the filing and recording of the articles of incorporation. This
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of the sole owner thereby becomes liable for a debt contracted by him on behalf
of the corporation when no fraud was practiced by him on the creditor and the
creditor extended the entire credit to the corporation, since the creditor gets all
he bargained for when he subjects the corporate property to the payment of his
debt. Later, in Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703 (1984),
the court, while recognizing the "suspension" doctrine, held that it was error in
an attachment proceeding to sell a corporations real estate as the property of its
sole owner since corporate debts take precedence over the individual debts of the
owner and the only interest which such owner has in the assets of the corporation
is an equity after paying the debts of the corporation. For other Kentucky
decisions referring to the "suspension" doctrine, see Russell Lumber & Supply Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 262 Ky. 388, 90 S.W.2d 372 (1936); Kentucky Harlan Coal
Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53 S.W. 538 (1932); Geo. T. Stagg Co.
v. E. H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 113 Ky. 709, 68 S.W. 862 (1902); Louisville Gas Co.
v. Kaufman, 105 Ky. 131, 48 S.W. 434 (1898).
29 Until recently the "suspension" doctrine found one of its most frequent
expressions in the Kentucky cases, but in 1956 it broke forth with surprising vigor
in a North Carolina decision which provoked considerable alarm in that state. See
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955),
on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). In that case the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, on rehearing, held that the purchaser of all the stock in
a corporation became a necessary party plaintiff in a suit brought by the
corporation for breach of contract since as such purchaser he became at least the
equitable
owner The
of the
corporate
any recovery would be for his
use
and benefit.
court
said (91property
S.E.2d atand
586):
When one person acquires all the stock of a corporation, what then is the
status of the corporation and the property held in its name? We are of the
opinion and so hold that the corporation becomes dormant or inactive and
exists only for the purpose of holding legal title of the property for the use
and benefit of the single stockholder who becomes seized of the beneficial
title to the property. Not possessing the managerial agencies-stockholders,
directors, or oficers,-contemplated by statute, it can no longer act as a
corporation. Its decisions are the decisions of the single stockholder, and its
action is his action.
For comments on this case and its implications, see Latty, A Conceptualistic
Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation,34 N.C.L. Rev. 471 (1956); Latty,
The Close Corporationand the New North Carolina Business CorporationAct, 34
N.C.L. Rev. 432, 441-44 (1956).
In 1957 the North Carolina legislature responded to the Park Terrace
decision with curative legislation designed to remove the concept of "dormancy"
resulting from acquisition of all the stock in a corporation by less than three
persons, even if such acquisition had already occurred. See 2B N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-3.1(d)(repl. vol. 1960). But in Lester Bros., Inc. v. Pope Realty & Ins.
Co., 250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959), the court imposed partnership liability
for corporate debts upon two shareholders who had acquired all of the stock in
the corporation, holding that at the time the indebtedness was incurred in 1955
the creditor had a vested right in that liability under the law of North Carolina
as declared in the Park Terrace decision which the legislature could not take
away by retroactive legislation without violating the obligation of contract. The
possibility of the retroactive aspects of this curative legislation meeting difficulty
was foreshadowed in Comments on North Carolina 1957 Session Laws, 36 N.C.L.
Rev. 41, 48 (1957).
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section provides that the articles of incorporation shall be acknowledged "by at least three of the incorporators" before
delivery to the Secretary of State. 0 If the intent of the 1954
amendment permitting one person to "form" a corporation was to
permit that person to become the sole incorporator, as seems
clearly to have been the case, then it is wholly inconsistent to
continue the requirement of acknowledgment by three incorporators in such a case.3 ' While this appears to have been merely a
technical oversight, its correction would eliminate any residual
doubt as to the propriety of one person acting as the sole incorporator of a Kentucky corporation.
At the time of the Eisenman case it was customary for corporation statutes to require that directors hold stock in the corporation,3 2 a requirement that further complicated the concept of the
one-man corporation. Although the present Kentucky corporation
statute does not require directors to be shareholders unless the
articles of incorporation so require,33 there is nothing in the
present statute which suggests that the use of a board of directors
can be completely by-passed.34 The use of "dummy" directors
may be a satisfactory, or at least an acceptable, answer in many,
perhaps most, instances. Yet it is possible that a sole shareholder
30 KRS 271.045. (Emphasis added.)
31 The Attorney General of Kentucky issued an opinion on February 27, 1959,
to the effect that, since KRS 271.025 permits one person to incorporate, in such
a case the articles of incorporation need be acknowledged by only the one incorporator. Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 42,873.
32 SeewStevens, Private Corporations § 158, at 735-36 (2d ed. 1949). The
courts, however, did not take this requirement of stock ownership too seriously.
For example, prior to 1946, at a time when the Kentucky corporation statute
required that a director own in his own right at least three shares of its capital
stock, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Kaye v. Kentucky Pub. Elevator Co.,
295 Ky. 661, 175 S.W.2d 142 (1943), held that three directors of a corporation
to whom it was alleged stock had been transferred for the sole purpose of
qualifying them as directors were not thereby disqualified from acting as directors.
The court said that "the general rule is that a director may hold his stock as a
trustee, or have only the legal title thereto, even for the express and sole purpose
of making him eligible unless the-situation was brought about in furtherance of a
dishonest or fraudulent scheme concerning the management or control of the
company." Id. at 665, 175 S.W.2d at 144.
32 KRS 271.345(1).
34 On March 8, 1961, the Attorney General of Kentucky issued an opinion
that KRS 271.025, which permits incorporation by
in which he took the poo
one person, does not have the effect of repealing by implication other sections
of the general corporation statute requiring acts to be performed by more than
one person. Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 61,206. This opinion specifically overruled an
earlier opinion, issued on May 24, 1955, which had indicated that KIRS 271.345,
pertaining to a board of directors, was nullified "when a corporation has been
chartered under KRS 271.025 or where all the shares of stock of a corporation
have been subsequently acquired by one person." Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 36,090.
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could find himself faced with a real problem as to "control" if the
two "dummy" directors should suddenly turn against his wishes
before their terms of office expired. The suggestion has been
made that in most jurisdictions this problem could be solved by a
charter or bylaw provision giving to the sole shareholder the
power to remove directors at any time with or without cause.3 5
It may be asked, however, why the sole shareholder should not be
allowed to accomplish directly what this procedure would allow
him to accomplish indirectly, namely, the complete and unrestrained control over corporate affairs.
It has been convincingly argued that there is nothing inherent
in the nature of corporate existence which requires the use of a
multi-membership board of directors.36 The practical necessity
for delegating managerial responsibility to a small group in the
case of corporations with many shareholders probably best explains the use of a board of directors and the recognition of such
a board as an attribute of corporateness when general corporation
statutes were first formulated.3 7 Since no such practical necessity
exists in the case of the one-man company, it seems only fair and
reasonable that in jurisdictions such as Kentucky which authorize
incorporation by one person, authorization should likewise be
given for dispensing with the customary three-man board."' This
35 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.13 (1958). The North Carolina Business
Corporation Act meets this problem by specifically providing that majority shareholders can remove the entire board or any individual director, with or without
cause, unless the articles or bylaws otherwise provide. 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-27
(f)(repl. vol. 1960). See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North
CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432, 444 (1956).
36 See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A
Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696, 702-14 (1960).
37 See Stevens, Private Corporations § 143 (2d ed. 1949). Nevertheless,
expressions can sometimes be found which suggest that a board of directors is
indispensable to corporate existence. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31
S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944), in which the court said, "A private business corporation
without a board of directors is an impossible concept." Statements such as this
seem extreme and unwarranted.
38 Iowa has done this recently as to corporations formed under the new Iowa
Business Corporation Act. Section 34 of that act as adopted in 1959 provided that
"the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of
directors." By an amendment to § 34 effective Tuly 4, 1961, it is specifically made
clear that the board of directors may consist of "one or more' persons. See
1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull. Vol. XXX-No. 26, June 21, 1961, f 26.3;
2 P-H Corp. Serv., Iowa U226 (1961). Under the "old" Iowa general corporation
there is no
Iowa acorporations,
available that
for incorporation
is still
statute, which
specific
statutory
requirement
a corporationof have
board of directors.
It
appears therefore that the shareholders could dispense entirely with the use of a
board of directors under that statute. See Kessler, supra note 36, at 726. See also
Hayes, Stockholders' Rights in the Iowa Corporation, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 459, 468

(1955).

KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 50,

would at least permit a one-man corporation to be organized with
a one-man board consisting of the sole shareholder. No doubt
such jurisdictions could justifiably take the additional step of
permitting the sole incorporator to dispense entirely with the use
of a board of directors as unnecessary to the structure and functioning of the one-man company. As Justice Rutledge once said
with regard to legislation on the subject of one-man companies:
This should involve not only direct and simple authority for
a single individual to incorporate, but also provision for
direct control of the incorporated enterprise by the individual whose business is incorporated. Every laborer knows
that John Doe is "boss" of John Doe, Incorporated. The
law should not be blind to such an elementary "fact of life"
in the corporate world. Nor should it create the opportunity,
which occasionally is seized, for a mere "dummy" to decide
the future of another man's business in a manner contrary
to that man's interests and desires.39

Tim MuLTiPL E-OwNERsHmP CoM-ANY
1. Distributionof control-In general.
When one turns from the one-man company to the close
corporation composed of two, three, four, or more participants,
he finds that the legal problems thereby generated tend to change
complexion, particularly in the area of control and management.
Whereas in the one-man company ownership and control coincide
in the sole owner, in the company composed of several participants control normally vests in the participants who own a
majority of the stock. It is they who have the power to elect all
or at least a majority of the board of directors. For this reason
participants holding a minority interest may seek some means of
securing an opportunity for participation in corporate affairs.
When considering the distribution of control in these multipleownership companies, it must be kept in mind that control
operates at both the shareholder level and the director level.
Although the general management of corporate business affairs
is vested in a board of directors, 0 there are certain matters of a
39 Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 Wash.
U.L.Q. 305, 389 (1937).
40 It has been held that decisions of the board of directors are not subject to
interference by a mere majority of the shareholders. Automatic Self-Cleansing
(Footnote continued on next page)

1961]
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fundamental nature relating to the structure and operation of the
enterprise which modern corporation statutes generally recognize
as within the ambit of shareholder action. These include such
matters as amendment of the articles of incorporation, 4 dissolution,4 2 sale of all the assets of the business, 43 and merger or con-

solidation. 44 Some of these matters, such as merger and consolidation, relate primarily to the affairs of the public issue corporation,
but others, particularly those concerning amendment of the articles of incorporation and dissolution, can touch the affairs of the
close corporation with as much frequency as those of the public
issue corporation. Accordingly, the participants in the close
corporation must evaluate their needs with regard to control both
in their capacities as shareholders and also in their capacities as
directors.
In addition to recognizing the two-level nature of control, it is
also necessary to realize that some of the legal devices available
to the participants in the close corporation through which they
can distribute control operate within the framework of the
corporate structure itself while other such devices operate outside
the corporate framework and that a careful evaluation of the
relative merits of these alternative devices must be made to
determine which of them will best serve the needs of the participants from both a business and a legal standpoint. In the
discussion which follows attempt will be made to present some
of the specific control problems which face the participants in the
multiple-ownership company and to evaluate control devices
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.). In Manufacturers'
Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 121 Ky. 403, 406, 89 S.W. 248, 249 (1905),
the court observed: "The judgment or discretion of the governing body, usually a
board of directors, as to matters intra vires, is entirely beyond the control of the
stockholders through the intervention of the courts, except for frauds committed
or threatened against the corporation or the minority stockholders." However, if
all the shareholders in a corporation agree that certain action should be taken, it
is arguable that their voice should control over that of the board of directors. As
Professor Ballantine has pointed out, "the right to have the affairs of the
corporation managed by the hoard of directors is a right of each shareholder
derived from the statute under which the company is formed." Therefore, as he
says, "if the real parties in interest unanimously agree on lawful corporate acts,
their voice should control." Ballantine, Corporations § 43, at 123 (rev. ed. 1946).
A similar viewpoint has been expressed by Dean Stevens. See Stevens, Private
Corporations § 143, at 651-53 (2d ed. 1949).
41 KRS 271.445.
42 KlRS 271.500.
43 KRS 271.415.
44

KRS 271.470.
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which have been used to meet those problems in particular
relation to the law in Kentucky.
2. Cumulative voting.
If the main concern of each participant in the multiple-ownership company is that he be assured of representation on the board
of directors, he may find that this assurance, in Kentucky at least,
can be established through resort to the cumulative voting privilege, which is guaranteed to shareholders in Kentucky corporations by constitutional provision.4 5 Under this privilege a shareholder possessing one vote for each share of stock owned by him
(the usual situation) may concentrate his total number of votes
on one or more candidates of his choice instead of being required
to cast his votes on a single candidate for each director position
to be filled. The usefulness of this privilege to the individual
shareholder will depend, of course, on the total number of voting
shares he owns in relation to the number of directors on the board.
In a three-man corporation with a board of directors of three
persons, in which the shares of stock are divided equally among
the three shareholder-owners, any one of the shareholders through
use of cumulative voting could be assured of electing at least one
director. On the other hand, if there are five shareholders who
own equal interests in the stock of the corporation, one shareholder alone could not by means of cumulative voting elect one
of the directors on a three-man board.4"
45

Ky. Const. § 207. The provision reads:
In all elections for directors or managers of any corporation, each shareholder shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggre ate as he shall
be entitled to vote in said company under its charter, multiplied by the
number of directors or managers to be elected at such election; and each
shareholder may cast the whole number of votes, either in person or by
proxy, for one candidate, or distribute such votes among two or more

candidates, and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other

manner.
A similar provision appears in the Kentucky corporation statute. See KRS
271.315(2). Kentucky is one of thirteen states that makes cumulative voting

mandatory by constitutional provision. The other states are Arizona, Idaho, Illinois,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South

Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Ten additional states, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming, provide for mandatory cumulative voting in their corporation
statutes. See 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 522, 524 (1960).

46 For discussion of the mathematics of cumulative voting, see Cole, The Legal
and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950). For a
good review of the history and functioning of cumulative voting in American
corporations, both large and small, see Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors
(1951).
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Furthermore, even in those instances in which the cumulative
voting privilege would mathematically assure the individual shareholder of representation on the board, he must be alert to certain
maneuvers which can sometimes be used to weaken or destroy
the effectiveness of his right. One of these consists in reducing
the total number of directors, thereby increasing the total number
of shares it takes to elect one director; 47 another consists in classifying the board of directors so that only a portion of the board is
elected in any one year.48 Both of these maneuvers it appears
could be effectively thwarted by the shareholders in a Kentucky
corporation through provisions in the articles of incorporation (or
bylaws) setting up a requirement of unanimous consent of the
shareholders for any changes in the total number of directors or
in their terms of office.49
As to the classification procedure, it would probably be unwise
to assume that the provision in the Kentucky corporation statute
47

See, e.g., KRS 271.345(4), which provides that the number of directors
may be prescribed by the articles of incorporation or bylaws. A majority of the
shareholders could, therefore, by amendment of the articles or bylaws change
the number of directors as originally fixed. Some of the states with mandatory
cumulative voting provisions have built into their corporation statutes a means of
preventing a majority from reducing the number of directors to the detriment of
the minority. The Michigan General Corporation Act, for example, provides that
the number of directors cannot be reduced if a sufficient number of votes are
recorded against such reduction which, if cumulatively voted, would elect one or
more directors and if, after the reduction, these same votes, could not cumulatively
elect the same number of directors as before the reduction. 5A Mich. Comp. Laws
(Mason's Supp. 1956).
§ 450.13
48
See, e.g., KRS 271.345(4) which provides that "directors shall be elected
for terms of one year, except that it may be provided by the articles or bylaws, or
by a vote of the shareholders, that the directors be elected for terms of two years
or three years, in which case the terms shall be so arranged that the terms of an
equal or nearly equal number of directors will expire each year."
49 Unanimous consent for amendment of the articles of incorporation would
seem to be clearly authorized by KRS 271.445(2), which permits an increase in
the voting requirement for amending the articles above the usual majority vote.
Unanimous consent for changes in the bylaws would seem to be authorized by
KRS 271.315(7), which provides broadly that the articles or the bylaws may
specify the votes that shall be necessary for the transaction of any business, except
where restricted by the corporation statute itself. KRS 271.285, the section of
the statute devoted to the bylaw-making power, contains no restrictions as to the
number of votes needed to amend the bylaws. As said by the New York Court of
Appeals in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829, 832 (1945),
which involved, among other things, an attempt by shareholders in a close
corporation to require unanimous consent for amendment of the bylaws:
Every corporation is empowered to make by-laws . ..and by-laws of some
sort or other are usually considered to be essential to the organization of a
corporation .... The State has an interest in seeing to it that such "private
laws" or by-laws as the corporation adopts are not inconsistent with the public
law and not such as will turn the corporation into some other kind of entity.
But, once proper by-laws have been adopted, the matter of amending them is,
we think, no concern of the State.
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authorizing the staggering of the terms of office of the board of
directors would meet the same fate that befell a similar provision
in the Illinois Business Corporation Act when the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in the well-known case of Wolfson v. Avery,"0 declared
such provision unconstitutional as incompatible with the section
of the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing shareholders in Illinois
corporations the right to vote cumulatively in the election of
directors. The Illinois court relied heavily on the debates of the
Illinois constitutional convention at which the provision was
adopted and the contemporaneous comments in the public press
as indicating a purpose to afford the minority protection in
proportion to its voting strength.5 However, the debates of the
constitutional convention at which the Kentucky provision was
adopted do not carry the same persuasive implications as to
purpose.5 2 These debates reveal that the effect of failure to elect
the entire board at one time was actually considered in the
adoption of the Kentucky constitutional provision and a suggestion made but rejected that language be used requiring that all
53
directors (or at least one-half) be voted upon at one time.
The inference which one writer has derived from the failure of
this suggestion to be adopted is that the delegates were apparently
willing to accept classification as compatible with cumulative
voting.54
It appears, therefore, that the minority shareholder in Kentucky can best insulate himself against the possible adverse effects
of the classification procedure by insisting on a built-in protection
in the form of a provision in the articles of incorporation (or bylaws) requiring unanimous approval for adoption of any proposals
50 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
5' 126 N.E.2d at 707-10.
52 3 Proceedings and Debates in the Convention, Kentucky 3732-37 (1890).
Actually, there seems to be some question whether even the debates at the Illinois
constitutional convention carried the strong implications as to purpose stressed by
the court in Wolfson v. Avery. In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Hershey
questioned the interpretation as to purpose which the majority of the court had
derived from resort to extrinsic aids and urged that a proper analysis of the
constitutional provision demonstrated that the statutory classification procedure
was not unconstitutional. Commentators have likewise found similar objections to
the majority opinion. See, e.g., Sell & Fuge, Impact of Classified Corporate
Directorateson the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
151 (1956).
53 3 Proceedings and Debates in the Convention, Kentucky 3732-35 (1890).
54
Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal, Reduction and Classification of
CorporateBoards, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 758 (1955).
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to change the terms of directors. 55 The disastrous consequences
which can result to an individual shareholder who fails to require
such a provision are vividly illustrated by a recent Ohio case5
in which the articles of incorporation of a closely held corporation
had been amended so as to provide three-year terms for the threeman board, with their terms so staggered that only one director
would be elected at each annual meeting. The effect of this
action, upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio, was to deprive one
of the shareholders, who owned forty per cent of the company's
stock, from securing representation on the board of directors
through use of the cumulative voting privilege given to him by
the Ohio corporation statute.5" The 1955 revision of the Ohio
General Corporation Law has eliminated the possibility of such
an extreme maneuver in the future by providing that each class
55 See note 49 supra.
0

G Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 183 N.E.2d 780 (1956).
57 When this case came before the intermediate appellate court of Ohio for
decision, the court held that the resolution amending the articles of incorporation
so as to classify the three member board into three classes was invalid since it
could not be assumed that the authority granted by the corporation statute to
classify the board of directors was intended to permit complete nullification of the
right of a shareholder to cumulate his vote, a right which had been recognized
in te corporation statute long before the privilege of classification was granted.
Humphrys v. Winous Co., 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955). In reversing,
the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the statutory provision for cumulative
voting as guaranteeing to minority shareholders only the right of cumulative
voting and not as necessarily guaranteeing the effectiveness of the exercise of that
right. Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780, 789 (1956).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a similar position as to a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to vote cumulatively in Janney v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956). In this case the
Pennsylvania court said (128 A.2d at 80):
All that the Constitution provides is that each stockholder should have the
right to concentrate his votes on one or more candidates to be chosen in any
given election; that right is undisputed, but as to how many candidates there
shall be at the election, whether they must consist of all the directors of the
corporation, whether they cannot be classified and their elections staggered,
-as to these and many other factors which necessarily enter into each
situation the Constitution is wholly silent; to write into it any such limiting or
qualifying provisons as contended for by plantiff would be an extreme exercise
of judicial legislation.
The Pennsylvania court sought to distinguish the Illinois case of Wolfson v.
Avery on the technical ground that the Pennsylvania constitutional provision is
framed in terms of each shareholder having as many votes as the number of
candidates whereas the Illinois constitutional provision is framed in terms of the
number of directors. However, this distinction based on the choice of language is
not altogether persuasive. See Sell & Fuge, supra note 52, at 172-74.
Other recent cases in states having mandatory cumulative voting provisions
include Bohannan v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957)
(provision for classified board in articles of incorporation held to be permissible),
and State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958)
(provision for classified board in bylaws held to be incompatible with constitutional
provision).
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in the case of a classified board must consist of not less than three
directors.58
In addition to charter or bylaw provisions which bar reduction
in the number of directors and which preclude use of the
classification procedure, a minority interest may also need to
guard against the possible ability of the majority to remove
directors elected by the minority, thereby creating vacancies
which could be filled by the majority despite the presence of
the cumulative voting privilege. Shareholders are considered as
having an inherent power to remove a director for cause, 59 and
statutes now exist in a number of states granting to shareholders
the power of removal without cause. 60 Furthermore, even in the
absence of such statutes, it appears that a corporation may adopt
charter or bylaw provisions for the removal of directors without
cause.6 Exercise of this power of removal could, of course,
effectively nullify the cumulative voting privilege, particularly if
the removal can be accomplished without cause. 62 To overcome
this threat some states have adopted statutory provisions which
prohibit the removal of any individual director if the votes of a
sufficient number of shares are voted against his removal which,
if cumulatively voted, would be sufficient to elect at least one
director.63 Since Kentucky has no such statutory provision, a
minority group interested in protecting its cumulative voting
58 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.57 (Page's Supp. 1960).

v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 889 (1959).
See Ballantine, Corporations § 185, at 434 (rev. ed. 1946); Stevens,
Private Corporations § 163, at 764 (2d ed. 1949).
62 Once removal has been accomplished, the corporation statute in Kentucky
tends to favor the majority. KRS 271.345(4) (a) provides that vacancies in the
board of directors are to be filled by the remaining members of the board,
except as otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws. Such persons hold office
untiltheir successors are elected by the shareholders, which may be at the next
annual meeting or at a special meeting called for such purpose.
63 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 810 (Deering 1953); 2B N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-27(f)(repl. vol. 1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.58(C) (Page's Supp.
1960). In jurisdictions which do not have such a statutory provision it has been
suggested that courts could forestall arbitrary use of the removal power by the
majority to defeat the cumulative voting right by limiting the power of removal
without cause to representatives of the majority. Comment, Cumulative VotingRemoval, Reduction and Classification of Corporate Boards, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev.
751, 753 (1955). In New York, a permissive cumulative voting jurisdiction, it
has been held that an amendment of a corporate charter to provide for cumulative
voting had the effect of invalidating an existing bylaw provision which provided
for removal of a director without cause. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761,
116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
59 Campbell
60
61
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privilege from this removal power may need to arrange for such
protection through appropriate clauses in the articles of incorporation or bylaws restricting the scope of the power of removal
which can be exercised by the majority.64
This in turn raises another interesting question which presses
in the opposite direction. Can shareholders in a corporation
organized in a mandatory cumulative voting jurisdiction, such as
Kentucky, agree not to exercise their cumulative voting privilege?
If a majority in interest were to persuade the minority to agree
to such an arrangement, would it be binding on the minority?
Two recent cases outside of Kentucky have indicated that shareholders can make such an arrangement, at least if it is done
through private agreement among themselves and not as part of
the corporate structure itself.
In the most recent of these cases, Sensabaugh v. Poson Plywood Co.,"5 the issue arose as the result of a bylaw which a
majority of the shareholders of a Montana corporation had
adopted providing for straight voting by the shareholders. Later,
a shareholder who had approved this bylaw asserted his right to
vote cumulatively at a corporate election over the objection of the
presiding officer. The latter refused to permit any of the shareholders to vote cumulatively and counted all ballots as straight
ballots. The shareholder then brought a suit to have the election
of directors declared null and void and to have the court order
the holding of a new election. The Supreme Court of Montana
affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff shareholder on the basis that
a corporation could not through a bylaw deny the right of cumulative voting. Two of the judges, however, indicated that, in their
opinion, there was nothing in the constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative voting which would inhibit shareholders
from agreeing among themselves outside the corporate structure
to forego their right to vote cumulatively. A third judge concurred
in the result, thereby making a three-judge majority. A fourth
judge concurred on the point that a corporation could not deprive
a shareholder of his right to vote cumulatively, but dissented as to
the result reached on the ground that the bylaw provision should
64

See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.59 (1958).

65 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959).
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have been considered as a binding agreement among those who
assented to it. A fifth judge dissented from that part of the
opinion of the first two judges which had upheld the right of
shareholders to agree to give up their cumulative voting rights,
his position being that the constitutional provision voiced a public
policy of the state as to the election of directors which could not
be altered by private contract.
It is evident that at least three, and perhaps four, out of the
five judges in this Montana case were willing to concede that
shareholders could by agreement among themselves voluntarily
give up their cumulative voting right, the only difference among
the judges being the form which such agreement could take. The
two judges who wrote the dominant opinion relied heavily on the
earlier Nebraska case of E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert,66
in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska had upheld a private
agreement that conflicted with the cumulative method of voting
guaranteed by the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska court
had taken the position that the constitutional provision was

intended to secure to minority shareholders a greater representation in corporate business'affairs and to prevent involuntary loss
of the cumulative voting privilege but was not intended to deprive
a shareholder of the right to contract with respect to the voting
of his stock if he so desired.
While there appear to be no Kentucky cases directly raising
this question, in the early case of Schmidt v. Mitchell,67 the Kentucky Court of Appeals asserted that no shareholder was required
to vote his stock cumulatively at a corporate election unless he
so desired. From this it could perhaps be inferred that the court
would not have objected to an agreement among the shareholders
in which they had voluntarily surrendered their cumulative voting
privilege. However, there is a considerable difference between
a shareholder deciding at any given corporate election not to
avail himself of his cumulative voting privilege and a shareholder
surrendering such voting privilege as to future elections by virtue
of a shareholders' agreement. One thing the court did stress in
the Mitchell case was that no shareholder had been denied the
right to vote his stock cumulatively.
66 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288.(1954).
67 101 Ky. 570, 41 S.W. 929 (1897).
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3. Classificationof stock.
Another device which may prove useful in achieving the
desired end of representation on the board of directors is the
classification of shares into two or more classes with provision
for election of a designated portion of the board by each class."'
There is ample statutory basis in Kentucky for using this approach
since the Kentucky corporation statute, like other modem corporation statutes, authorizes the use of more than one class of stock. 9
However, a disadvantage which the use of this approach might
have today is its possible adverse tax effect in depriving the
corporation of eligibility to be taxed on a partnership basis under
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.7 0 Moreover, in a
state like Illinois which has stressed proportional representation
as the purpose served by cumulative voting, there might well be
objection to any arrangement which interferes with the right of
in the election of all directors at
each shareholder to participate
7'1
meeting.
each annual
This latter objection could possibly be raised under Kentucky
law since the Kentucky constitutional provision on cumulative
voting reads in terms of each shareholder having the right to cast
the number of votes to which his share ownership entitles him
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected at such election.7 2 Even if it should be concluded that the statutory provision
authorizing classification of the board of directors is not incompatible with this provision, it would not necessarily follow that
an arrangement classifying stock so as to enable each class to
elect only a portion of the board would likewise not be incom68 See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.23 (1958).

69KRS 271.155(1) provides: "The shares of a corporation may be divided
"
into one
7 0 or more classes or one or more series within any class ...
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1871-77. One of the requirements for
receiving this special tax treatment is that the corporation have only one class of
stock. However, under Regulations issued by the Treasury Department, this
requirement is deemed to be met if two or more classes of stock are identical in
every respect except the right of each class to elect the number of directors
proportionate to the number of shares in that class. Treas. Reg. § 1.1871-1(g)
(1959). See Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalizationof Corporations, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 185, 189-90 (1959).
71 See People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E.
707 (1922), which held that the constitutional provision on cumulative voting
prevented the use of nonvoting preferred shares. See also § 28 of the present
Illinois Business Corporation Act, which provides that "each outstanding share,
regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote on each matter submitted to a
vote at a meeting of shareholders." 1 IM.Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.28 (1959).
72 See note 45 supra.
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patible. Under the former arrangement the shareholder would
still be free to cumulate his votes in relation to all the directors
to be elected at any one time whereas under the latter arrangement the shareholder would be confined in his voting to a particular portion of the board to be elected. This conflicts with the
express language of the section. However, if it can be assumed
that the purpose of the cumulative voting provision in Kentucky
is merely to afford an opportunity for minority representation
rather than to assure proportional representation by minorities at
all times, then it is arguable that use of classified stock as a means
of giving each separate interest in the corporation representation
on the board should not be deemed to clash with the constitutional provision on cumulative voting. Indeed, use of classified
shares could prove to be an even more effective means than
cumulative voting for providing the desired representation on the
board by each interest if the stock is so divided among the participants that no one of them could elect a director by cumulating
his votes. 3
4. Voting agreements.
Although it appears that in Kentucky the two devices just
discussed, cumulative voting and classified stock, are reasonably
reliable for achieving the desired end of assuring representation
on the board of directors, the participants in a close corporation
may sometimes prefer to make use of devices outside the
corporate framework for this purpose. Here again, two devices
appear to be most suitable-use of a simple shareholders' pooling
agreement or use of the more formal voting trust.
The shareholders' pooling agreement is one in which the
parties agree to vote their stock in the election of directors (and
perhaps in other matters) as mutually agreed upon by them.
Early courts tended to invalidate such agreements, but the prevailing attitude today is to uphold them so long as they are formed
for a proper purpose, that is, to serve corporate ends and not to
commit fraud or perpetrate wrong on other shareholders.7 4
73 For a discussion of certain precautions a draftsman may need to take into
account in setting up class voting, see 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.24 (1958).
74 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 5.08 (1958).
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constitutional provision on cumulative voting. With regard to the
Illinois constitutional provision and its effect on unanimity
requirements in Illinois, Professor Cary has suggested that a court
might feel concern as to whether a rule of unanimity is fundamentally consistent with the theory of cumulative voting, since
such a requirement evidences a policy to favor the representation
of minorities on the board, whereas a unanimous vote requirement
nullifies corporate action in the event of any dissent.'29 He adds,
however, that "perhaps the function of the cumulative vote should
be limited to companies which are publicly held, or at least to
those where there is no prior agreement on voting written into
the charter or by-laws." 13 0
As to establishing a high vote requirement at the director
level, the answer for Kentucky seems quite favorable. In the first
place, there is the broad language of the statutory provision on
"voting rights," which, as indicated, does not necessarily need to
be construted as restricted to voting at the shareholder level.131
In addition, there is specific language in the section of the statute
devoted to the board of directors which points to a legislative
intent to recognize such a requirement. This section contains a
series of miscellaneous provisions introduced by the clause, "except as otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws." 13 2 One of
these provisions states that "the acts of a majority of the directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the
acts of the board of directors." 33 This provision, taken together
with the introductory clause, seems clearly to sanction the possible use of greater than majority vote for director action.
Another method of achieving veto over corporate action,
whether at the director or the shareholder level, is through the
129 Cary, How Illinois CorporationsMay Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427, 481 (1953).
130 Ibid. The possible relationship which veto requirements can have to
cumulative voting is well illustrated in the observation by Professor O'Neal that
cumulative voting coupled with a high vote requirement for director action could
give each shareholder a veto over action at the board level. O'Neal, Molding the
Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1956). Another writer has commented that, due to the
power which majority shareholders have to ignore minority representatives, "in
the absence of a stockholder agreement defining the rights and remedies of a
minority in a close corporation, cumulative voting is of little practical help."
Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. Law. 550, 558

(1961).

a1 KRS 271.815(7).
KRS 271.345(4).
KRtS 271.845(4) (c).

132

133
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use of high quorum requirements for shareholder and director
meetings. 3 4 If unanimous attendance is required to constitute a
quorum, a shareholder or director by staying away from a meeting
could prevent corporate action from being taken. This presupposes, of course, that the shareholder or director knows in advance
that certain matters are to come before the meeting which he
does not wish to approve. If he attends the meeting and a matter
to which he objects arises for the first time at the meeting, a high
quorum requirement alone will not protect him. He then needs
the protection of a high vote requirement. To achieve complete
veto protection, therefore, a high vote requirement becomes a
desirable supplement to whatever quorum requirements may
have been established.

135

If shareholders in a Kentucky corporation should wish the
double protection of both high quorum and high vote requirements, there appears to be ample statutory authority in the Ken-

tucky corporation statute for use of high quorum requirements
both at the shareholder and at the director level. The provision
regarding quorums at shareholders' meetings is clear and unambiguous. It reads, "except as otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation: (a) the presence, in person or by proxy, of the
holders of a majority of the voting power of all shareholders shall
The provision regarding quorum at
constitute a quorum.... ,,13'

directors' meetings, while clear enough in recognizing possible
changes in the usual majority, is unfortunately not as clear as it
should be as to the corporate document in which such changes
may appear. The provision appears among the miscellaneous
provisions pertaining to director action in the section dealing
with the board of directors. 37 The provision itself reads that "a
majority of the board of directors shall constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business, unless the bylaws provide that a
different number shall constitute a quorum, which in no case
134 See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 4.22 (1958).
135 One method of protecting the high quorum requirement is to require that
notices of meetings state the business to be transacted at the meeting. This would
serve to sidetrack the possibility of a particular shareholder unwittingly attending
a meeting at which corporate action might be taken which he opposed. 1 o'Neal,
Close Corporations § 4.22 (1958). However, any scheme which induces shareholders to stay away from corporate meetings to that extent reduces the opportunities for resolving differences through combined deliberation and discussion. Ibid.
136 KRS 271.335(2) (a).
137

]KRS 271.845(4), (4) (c).
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shall be less than one-third of the total number of directors nor
less than two directors." 38 This provision, however, appears in
relation to an introductory clause to the entire series of miscellaneous provisions which reads "except as otherwise provided in
the articles or bylaws." 3 ' Does this mean that the change can
appear in either the articles or bylaws or, as suggested by the
language of the provision itself, must the change be made in the
bylaws? If confined to the bylaws, the rather anomalous result
is produced that quorum changes with regard to shareholders'
meetings must appear in the articles whereas quorum changes
as to directors' meetings must appear in the bylaws. Quirks such
as this are not uncommon in corporation statutes and again
suggest the need for placing provisions requiring a high vote
or
40
setting a high quorum in both the charter and the bylaws.1
In summary, then, the Kentucky corporation statute would
appear to contain the needed flexibility to permit the use of
charter or bylaw clauses containing veto provisions and to forestall the likelihood of a Benintendi decision being handed down
by the courts of this state. However, it must be remembered
that, while veto provisions can prove useful at times to the
shareholders of a close corporation, 141 such provisions enable

any one shareholder to block proposed corporate action. The
shareholders must ask themselves, therefore, whether the need
for protection of minority interests through use of the veto power
138 KRS 271.345(4) (c). (Emphasis added.)
130 KRS 271.345(4). (Emphasis added.)
140See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 4.23 (1958).
141 One of the possible occasions for beneficial use of veto provisions in the
close corporation is that pertaining to the issue of additional stock. Even if a
shareholder possesses a pre-emptive right to subscribe to his proportionate share
of the new issue, he may not be in a position to make the purchase for financial
or other reasons. If the price of the new issue is considerably below the true
value of the stock, his interest in the corporation may suffer serious dilution. In
Scheirich v. Otis-Hidden Co., 204 Ky. 289, 264 S.W. 755 (1924), the Kentucky
Court of Appeals refused to intercede on behalf of a shareholder who sought to
have the court nullify an increase in the capital stock of the corporation because
the new stock was offered to shareholders at par instead of at its book value.
Since it appears, therefore, that in Kentucky a shareholder cannot depend on court
intervention to protect his interests from dilution, the veto arrangement assumes
all the more significance as a means whereby the minority shareholder may
protect himself from oppressive action by the majority. Compare McClanahan v.
Heidelberg Brewing Co., 303 Ky. 739, 199 S.W.2d 127 (1947) (shareholder's
pre-emptive right does not entitle him to purchase additional issue of stock at par
rather than at its market value as set by corporation). See generally Comment,
Pre-emptive Rights in Close Corporations,23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 697 (1956).
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is so great as to override the benefits to be derived from the
greater flexibility in corporate action possible through majority
vote. 42
RESTRICTIONS ON STOCK TRANSFER

1. The first-option restriction.
Although proper allocation of control is a paramount consideration to the participants in a close corporation, they will also
likely wish protection against a possible transfer of stock to
strangers with whom they do not care to be associated. This
protection may be needed not only against possible voluntary
transfers by one or more of the participants themselves but also
against involuntary transfers by operation of law, such as may

occur upon the death of one or more of the participants. Restrictions on the transfer of stock can take many forms and can be
framed to operate in various ways, but one of the most popular
and useful restrictions is the first-option restriction. This restriction typically imposes a requirement that before stock of a shareholder is transferred to an outsider an offer must first be made
to sell the stock to the corporation or to the other shareholders
(or perhaps both). Such a restriction may appear as part of a
private agreement among the shareholders or as one of the provisions governing the corporate affairs appearing in the articles
of incorporation or the bylaws.
Although at first there was some tendency to condemn these
first-option restrictions as constituting illegal restraints on the
alienation of property, they are generally sustained today as
reasonable restraints not involving an absolute prohibition against
the transfer of property. 143 Where the restriction appears in the
142 1 O'Neal, Close
143Id. § 7.09. To

Corporations § 4.30 (1958).
be guarded against are restrictions that tend to place an
absolute restriction on transfer, such as restrictions which prohibit transfer without
the consent of the directors or other shareholders. These have frequently been
held invalid as imposing unreasonable restraints upon the alienation of property.
Ballantine, Corporations § 337, at 778 (rev. ed. 1946). Even "consent restrictions, however, have sometimes been upheld, and Professor Lattin comments that
the tendency of recent decisions is to uphold such restrictions, a tendency which
he attributes to a recognition that the needs of the participants in an enterprise

(particularly the closely held group) may override the policy against restraint.
Lattin, Corporations 340-41 (1959).

Of course, if a statute specifically authorizes

the type of restriction involved, the problem of legality is minimized since the
statute can be treated as establishing a public policy of the state favoring the
restriction. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Dumnmit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S.W. 695 (1927), in
(Footnote continued on next page)
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articles of incorporation, it has been held binding as a contract
between the corporation and the shareholders, under the recognized doctrine that the charter of a corporation involves a
contract not only between the corporation and the state but also
between the corporation and its shareholders. 144 On the other

hand, where the restriction appears as a mere bylaw provision,
some doubt has existed as to its enforceability.-4 However, most
courts today seem willing to treat such a bylaw provision as
constituting a separate agreement binding upon all those assenting
14
to it, even if the bylaw itself remains of doubtful validity.
In Taylor's Adn'r v. Taylor, 47 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
indicated its approval of bylaw restrictions of the first-option
variety, even in the absence of statutory authority for such bylaws.
There would seem to be little doubt, therefore, that, in view of
this favorable attitude on the part of the court coupled with a
provision in the present corporation statute which specifically
refers to the regulation of stock transfers in the bylaws,'148 such

restrictions will be recognized today in Kentucky even if included
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

which the court upheld a provision in the articles of incorporation and bylaws
of a warehousing corporation restricting the issuance and sale of its common
stock to members of a cooperative marketing association organized pursuant to a
cooperative marketing act which specifically directed that the bylaws of the
association must prohibit the transfer of the common stock of the association to
persons not engaged in the production of the agricultural products handled by
the assosiation and which authorized such associations to form other corporations
to perform services needed in connection with the products handled by the
association.
144 Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 348, 152 At. 723 (Sup.
Ct. 1930). In Thompson v. Fairleigh, 300 Ky. 144, 147, 187 S.W.2d 812, 813
(1945), speaking in relation to a provision in the articles of incorporation for
retiring preferred stock, the court said: "It is primary law that the charter of a
private corporation constitutes a contract between it and its stockholders and also
between the stockholders inter se." However, it has been held that once an
unrestricted stock certificate has been issued to a shareholder, the corporation
through amendment of the bylaws cannot later impose a restriction without his
consent, since to do so would impair the contract existing between him and the
corporation.
App.
1959). Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ.
A4pp
Ballantine, Corporations § 837, at 779 (rev. ed.
1946).
146 See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Searles
v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 Ad. 391 (1929); Elson v.
Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1 N.W.2d 314 (1941).
147 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957).
148 See KRS 271.225, which reads: "The transfer of shares of stock may be
regulated by the bylaws provided such bylaws are not inconsistent with the
provisions of Chapter 274 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes." This latter reference
is to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which was adopted in Kentucky in 1944.
See Ky. Acts 1944, ch. 12. This act, however, was repealed in Kentucky as of
July 1, 1960, when the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in this state.
See Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, § 10-102.
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in the bylaws rather than in the articles of incorporation. The
Taylor case, however, illustrates the strict construction that courts
sometimes give to such provisions and the need which thereby

arises for the language used in specifying a restriction to be
clear and explicit.
In the Taylor case a corporate bylaw read that "no transfer or
sale of the stock of the Company can be made without first offering said stock for sale to the remaining stockholders." The stock
in the company had been held by three brothers. When one of
them died, he left his stock to his widow under his will. Later
his administrator and the widow sued the corporation and its
president to compel a transfer of the stock to her. The defendants
pleaded noncompliance with the bylaw restriction on the transfer
of the stock. The court, however, reversing the chancellor, held
that the corporation must transfer the stock to the widow. The
court treated the words "transfer" and "sale" as used in the bylaw
as synonymous, adopting the rather surprising position that "the
use of the word 'transfer' looks to a sale and has no natural
application to any other disposition." 149 Here, argued the court,
there was no sale of the stock but a devolution of title by operation of law.
Whatever criticism of this reasoning by the court in the Taylor
case might be thought appropriate,5 0 the decision makes it evident that when a restriction is intended to bind the estate of a
deceased shareholder, the restriction should specifically so provide. Even such additional language might not have sufficed at
the time of the Taylor decision, in view of the comments made by
the Kentucky court in that case when attempting to distinguish a
Massachusetts case presenting a similar issue. 151 In this latter
case the articles of incorporation of a closely held corporation
contained a provision which read that "no sale, pledge or transfer
of the stock of this corporation shall be valid unless the same
shall have been first offered in writing to the corporation. . ..
The court held that the executors of a deceased shareholder were
obligated to offer the stock to the company in accordance with
this restriction despite the fact that the shareholder had be149301 S.W.2d at 583.
150 See 46 Ky. L.J. 618 (1958); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 294 (1957).
15' Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of Am.

Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953).
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queathed the stock to certain named persons. The court reasoned
that the language of the restriction was sufficiently broad to
apply to all transfers of stock and that the executors, who acquired
title to the stock in the place of the testatrix, acquired no greater
rights than the testatrix and held the shares subject to the same
restrictions on transfer which were in effect at the time of her
death.
The Kentucky court sought to distinguish this Massachusetts
case on two grounds: (1) in the Massachusetts case the condition
read that no transfer should be "valid" whereas in the Kentucky
case the condition read that the company would not recognize a
sale unless the condition was complied with, and (2) in the Kentucky case a statute existed which authorized the probate court
to order the transfer by the personal representative of shares of
stock to the persons entitled under the will to receive such stock.
Actually, however, it is doubtful whether either of these grounds
was sufficient to distinguish satisfactorily the Massachusetts decision. The first ground seems somewhat strained and the second
seems to have involved an unwarranted interpretation of the
probate statute. 15 2 The court evidently thought that this statute
required it to treat the persons named in the will as the ones
entitled to receive the stock whereas a proper reading of the
statute seems to have left this issue open for independent determination by appropriate rules of law. It may be doubted,
therefore, whether the statute was intended to carry the absolute
mandate indicated by the court. Nevertheless, this interpretation
of the statute by the court, if adhered to, might have interfered
rather seriously with the efforts of shareholders in the close
corporation to protect themselves against the possible unwanted
intrusion of outside interests.'Y However, the possible adverse
effects of this interpretation may have been averted by the recent
repeal of the statutory provision upon which the court rested its
154
argument.
152 This statutory provision, which appeared as KRS 895.280, read:
In order to effect the distribution of a deceased person's estate either
under a will or in case of intestacy the county court may... authorize the
personal representative to transfer shares of corporate stock which the
decedent owned at his death or which was acquired after that by the
estate. Such transfers shall be made to the persons entitled under the will
or as distributees in case of intestacy....
'53 See 46 Ky. L.T. 618, 621-23 (1958).
154 Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 186, art. VI, § 2, effective June 16, 1960.
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2. The transfer price.
In the drafting of first-option restrictions it is important to
provide a method or formula for fixing the transfer price. 55 While
judges have indicated that they will consider unfairness of the
selling price in detennining whether a particular restriction is
reasonable or not, they are reluctant to interfere merely because
of a disparity between the option price and the current or true
value of the stock. 56
The freedom which a court will give to the parties in the fixing
of the transfer price is evident from the case of Krebs v. McDonald's EX'x, 57 which the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided
in 1953. The shareholders in a close corporation executed a
written agreement whereby in the event of the sale or other
disposition of the stock held by any one of them the other shareholders were to have the right to purchase such stock at a price
to be fixed annually by the shareholders. Subsequently, one of
the shareholders who had participated in the formulation of this
method of evaluating the stock died and the surviving shareholders sought to purchase the stock at $100 per share, which
was the valuation set at the most recent annual meeting. The
widow of the deceased shareholder sought $175 a share, which
was the price the State Department of Re1venue had placed upon
it for inheritance tax purposes. In a suit by the surviving shareholders to compel the sale to them of the stock at the price fixed
by the method provided for in the agreement, the court upheld
the right of the surviving shareholders to enforcement of the
agreement at the valuation so established. The court said:
While a precise method of evaluating the stock might be
desirable from our standpoint, such restrictive agreements
often allow a lot of leeway .... In the case at bar, the
criteria for evaluating the stock are so broad in their implications that we conclude they amounted to a carte
blanche grant of power to the shareholders to set the
valuation at whatever they considered reasonable so long
155 A wide variety of formulae are available for this purpose. See the
discussion of these in 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 7.24 (1958).
156 See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
It is important, however, that the terms be as precise as possible so as to avoid
the possibility of a court considering the restrictive agreement too indefinite for
enforcement. See, e.g., Hardin v. Rosenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E.2d 901 (1957)
(price set at "market value or true value").
'57 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953).
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as they acted in good faith. . .

As heretofore stated, the

valuations under the agreement never sensitively reflected
changes in actual value throughout the prior twenty years of
its operation, and Mr. McDonald [the deceased shareholder] was one of the architects of this method. His
widow, as executrix and sole successor in interest, cannot
now be heard to complain about this method of valuation. 58
8. Notations on stock certificates.
If restrictions on the transfer of stock are to have their
intended effect of assuring the participants in a close corporation
that outsiders cannot acquire an interest in the corporation
without their consent, it is important that the restrictions take
the form of provisions appearing in the articles of incorporation
(or bylaws), rather than as provisions contained in a private
agreement outside the corporate framework, and that appropriate reference be made to the restrictions on each stock certificate. Otherwise, an innocent purchaser of stock without notice
of a restriction may gain a foothold in the corporation despite
the existence of the restriction.
This latter possibility is intensified by provisions which appear
in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code. Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides
that "there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares ...
unless the . . . restriction is stated upon the certificate." 59 A

similar provision in the Uniform Comnercial Code reads that
"unless noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it."160
Both of these provisions emphasize the importance of making
adequate reference to restrictions on the stock certificates. However, the language of the Uniform Commercial Code clarifies two
problems of interpretation which had remained unsettled under
the language of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
15s Id. at 89-90.

159 Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15. This act was at one time the law in all
fifty states, but has recently been supplanted by the Uniform Commercial Code in
those states, including Kentucky, that have enacted the code. See note 148 supra.
Two states, however, Kansas and North Dakota, when adopting the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, omitted § 15. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 901 (1953).
160 Uniform Commercial Code § 8-204. The code became effective in Kentucky on July 1, 1960. See Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77. The particular provision referred
to in the text appears in KRS 855.8-204.
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The first of these problems relates to whether it is necessary
to set forth the restriction verbatim on the stock certificate or
whether a shortened reference is sufficient. In Allen v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp.,161 the New York Court of Appeals took the position
that the word "stated" as used in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
"sanctions a notation indicating where the restriction appears and
permits incorporation by adequate reference." 62 The intent in
drafting the provision which now appears in the Uniform Commercial Code was to adopt this approach and to clarify the
ambiguity arising from the use of the word "stated" by using the
word "noted." 63
The other troublesome interpretative problem under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has been whether a restriction to be
valid even against purchasers with notice must be stated on the
stock certificate. The courts have been sharply divided in their
answer to this question. In Costello v. Fairell,'(4 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that, where the restriction did not appear
on the certificate, a purchaser who was unaware of it at the time
of the agreement to purchase or at the time she gave her checks
in payment but who was informed of it before delivery of the
certificate was not affected by the restriction. The court said that
in view of the language of section 15, "whether or not Mrs.
Farrell [the purchaser] was a purchaser for value in good faith,
without notice of the restriction, is, in our opinion, not ma(
The court pointed to the statement made by the
terial."' 65
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that section 15 was designed "to make certificates of stock so far as possible the sole
representatives of the shares which they represent."' 66 By way of
contrast, in an earlier New Jersey case, 67 the court, in refusing
1612 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
162 141 N.E.2d at 814, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
163 See the official comments to § 8-204 in Uniform Commercial Code, 1958
Official Text with Comments, published by the American Law Institute and
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
164 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557 (1951). Accord, Sorrick v. Consolidated
Tel. Co., 840 Mich. 463, 65 N.W.2d 713 (1954); Hopwood v. Topsham Tel. Co.,
120 Vt. 97, 132 A.2d 170 (1957).
165 Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1951).
16648 N.W.2d at 561; 6 U.L.A. 20 (1922).
' 67 Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J.Eq. 597, 124 At. 118 (Ch. 1924) (purchase by officer and director who was one of incorporators with notice of bylaw
restriction). Accord, Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930)
(purchase by officer who was one of original parties to agreement containing
restriction on transfer).
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to apply section 15 to a purchaser with notice, commented that
"this act, of course, was designed for the protection of innocent
purchasers of stock, in the open market or otherwise, and not at
all as a shield by one with knowledge of a condition to unconscionably protect himself from the consequences thereof." 6 8 A
recent New York case 69 echoes the same attitude when, in
referring to the New York counterpart of section 15, the court
said that "it does not affect the rule that one may not purchase
and obtain good title to stock in a corporation when one knows
of equities in another stockholder affecting such purchased
stock." 70 The Uniform Commercial Code has settled this conflict
by treating the unnoted restriction as ineffective except against
71
a person with actual knowledge of it. '
DEADLOCK AND DISSOLUTION

1. In general.
One of the most critical problems which face the participants
in a close corporation is that arising when disputes and disagreements among them hinder the amicable pursuit of their business
affairs. Such dissension becomes particularly acute when veto
arrangements prevent vital corporate decisions from being made,
thereby causing a deadlock and stalemate in the corporate
business. When dissension and deadlock reach such serious proportions, dissolution may seem to one or more of the participants
to be the only practical solution. Yet dissolution is not always as
readily available in a close corporation as in a commercial
partnership.
The Uniform Partnership Act recognizes the power of any
one partner to dissolve the partnership at any time even though
this may subject such partner to damages for violating the
partnership agreement.
As one court put it, "there can be no
168
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J.Eq. 597, 124 At. 118, 121 (Ch. 1924).
69

1 Tomoser v. Kampbausen, 807 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954).
170 121 N.E.2d at 624. Despite the reasonableness of this interpretation of
§ 15, it is stated in 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 5458 (penn. ed. rev.
vol. 1957) that a majority of the cases seem to have held the statutory language
to apply to all purchasers regardless of notice. To the same effect, see 58 Mich. L.
Rev. 620 (1955). It is there pointed out that special fiduciary considerations may

sometimes intervene as in Baumohl v. Goldstein and Doss v. Yingling, where the
person seeking to avoid the restriction was an officer of the corporation.
171 Uniform Commercial Code § 8-204; KRS 355.8-204.
172 Uniform Partnership Act §§ 31(2), 83(2). These same provisions appear

in KRS 862.300(2), .835(2). The Uniform Partnership Act was adopted by the
(Footnote continued on next page)

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 50,

such thing as an indissoluble partnership." 7 3 Individual participants in the close corporation do not ordinarily possess such
general power, at least in the absence of agreement among them
recognizing such power, and they may find that appeal to the
if their enterprise remains a
courts is fruitless despite 7dissension
4
profitable going concern.
The legal problems relating to dissolution in the close corporation typically move in two directions: (1) the extent to which
the participants may secure voluntary or involuntary dissolution
by virtue of procedures contained in the corporation statutes of
the state, and (2) the extent to which the participants may provide their own procedures for dissolution, either within or without
the corporate structure, independently of corporation statutes.
2. Dissolutionunder corporationstatutes.
The Kentucky corporation statute contains a group of sections
that deal extensively with the voluntary dissolution of a corporation. 5 These sections provide that a Kentucky corporation may
elect to dissolve voluntarily and wind up its affairs either by the
act of the corporation or by the written consent of the holders of
all the voting power of the shareholders. If dissolution is by act
of the corporation, such dissolution must be authorized by a vote
of the holders of at least a majority of the voting power of all
shareholders entitled to vote, unless the articles of incorporation
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Kentucky General Assembly during its 1954 legislative session and became

effective in Kentucky on Tune 17, 1954. See Ham, Kentucky Adopts the Uniform
PartnershipAct, 43 Ky. L.J. 5 (1954). This Act is now law in thirty-eight states.
See Table of States Wherein Act Has Been Adopted in 7 U.L.A., 1960 Cumulative
Annual Pocket Part.
173 Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. R. (N.Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286, 294
(1822).
174 See, e.g., Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d 625 (1937).
In a recent New York case, Application of Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc.2d
713, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 9 App. Div.2d 861, 193 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1959), which involved a petition for dissolution of a corporation because of
dissension and deadlock between the two fifty per cent owners, the trial judge
indicated his acute awareness of the similarity of the relationship between
partners and that between shareholders in a close corporation when he said

(182 N.Y.S.2d at 463):

In addition to the technical rules surrounding a partnership and perhaps
from a purely moral point of view, more important, there exists between
partners the highest degree of fidelity, loyalty, trust, faith and confidence.
When these characteristics in a partnership cease, then the true partnership
ceases, and when these characteristics cease between owners of equal, or
verily, substantially equal, shares in a close corporation, the close corporation
ceases to be beneficial to the deadlocked stockholders.

175 KRS 271.495-.545.
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require a greater percentage. The board of directors may call a
shareholders' meeting for such purpose, or shareholders holding
one-fifth of the voting power may have a meeting called for such
purpose. After dissolution has been authorized by the shareholders, the formalities which follow consist in the filing of an
intent to dissolve with the Secretary of State, followed later when
all debts and liabilities have been paid or provided for and all
remaining assets have been distributed to the shareholders, by
articles of dissolution, and ultimately by issuance of a certificate
of dissolution by the Secretary of State, upon assurance from the
Commissioner of Revenue that all tax liabilities of the corporation
have been satisfied in full.
Until 1952 the Kentucky corporation statute contained no
provision directly concerned with the problem of dissension and
deadlock in the close corporation. In that year, the General
Assembly, following a trend in other states, enacted a statutory
provision which provides for a decree of involuntary dissolution
in cases of deadlock.'7 6 The provision declares that a corporation
"may be dissolved" by decree of court when the corporation has
an even number of directors who are deadlocked in the management of the business and the shareholders are likewise divided
into two equal factions representing the respective views of the
directors or when the shareholders are unable to elect a board of
directors consisting of an uneven number. Under such conditions
voting power
the shareholders possessing one-half or more of the
77
receiver.
a
of
appointment
the
for
suit
a
bring
can
It is to be observed that this statute merely says a corporation
may be dissolved if the other provisions of the statute are satisfied.
Does this language mean that a court is free to decide in each
case whether to grant such relief, or does it mean that the court
must decree dissolution if the requirements of the statute are met?
If the language is considered discretionary and if the court should
take a restrictive approach to the granting of equitable relief by
way of dissolution, as courts in some jurisdictions have done under
similar statutes, 178 the usefulness of the Kentucky statute will no
176 Ky. Acts 1952, ch.
177 KRS 271.570(2).

116.

178 See, e.g., Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch.
1958) (chaneIlor refused to appoint receiver although for the last four annual
(Footnote continued on next page)
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doubt to that extent be curtailed. Furthermore, this statute,
predicated as it is on an equal division of voting power, does not
reach the problems of deadlock brought about through high vote
requirements whereby each shareholder regardless of his relative
share ownership has an absolute veto over corporate decisions.
Since it appears that unanimity and high vote requirements are

permitted by the Kentucky corporation statute, it would seem
desirable for the deadlock statute to be amended so as to account
from such veto arrangements, as has been
for deadlock arising
79
done in New York.1

Such an amendment to the Kentucky deadlock statute would
appear appropriate even if the general receivership sections of the
Kentucky corporation statute are considered as available to reach
this kind of deadlock. 80 These sections recognize the possibility
of a court appointing a liquidating receiver (as well as a receiver
pendente lite) in suits brought by creditors or shareholders of a
Kentucky corporation. In receivership suits in which a liquidating
receiver has been appointed the court may enter a decree of
involuntary dissolution after the corporate assets have been

liquidated. The sections, however, do not specify under what
circumstances a court would be justified in appointing a receiver,
such apparently being left to the general rules of equity jurisdiction.
In the case of Oscar C. Wright Co. v. Steenman,18s the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in upholding the appointment of a
receiver for a group of financially embarrassed corporations all
but one of which had suspended business, made the general
observation that "a court of equity has inherent jurisdiction at
the instance of stockholders (or creditors) where the facts call
for the exercise of its jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of either a
solvent or insolvent corporation 'on the ground of fraud, gross
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

meetings there had been a failure to elect directors because of an evenly divided
vote of the shareholders). But see Krall v. Krall, 141 Conn. 825, 106 A.2d 165
(1954) (appointment of receiver for deadlocked corporation upheld under provision of statute giving shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of capital
stock the right to apply for dissolution of the corporation and appointment of a
receiver "whenever any good and sufficient reason exists for the dissolution of
such corporation," even though there was no finding of fraud or gross mismanagement in the conduct of the business).
179 See N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 108.
180 KRS 271.550-.575.
181 254 Ky. 381, 71 S.W.2d 991 (1984).
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mismanagement or dissension among the stockholders, directors
or officers, if there is no other adequate remedy.""' 8 2 Although
dissension among the participants was recognized in this broad
statement as a possible ground for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the court three years later, in the case of Reid Drug Co.
v. Salyer,1s3 made it clear that mere dissension and deadlock
standing alone would not furnish grounds for the appointment of
a receiver for a solvent corporation. The court said that such
drastic measures as to a solvent corporation would not be approved "except in extremely rare cases of fraud and mismanagement."84 This lends no encouragement therefore to the use of
receivership proceedings as a "way out" for the dissatisfied shareholder who encounters good faith differences between himself
and his colleagues in an otherwise successful business. 18 5
Not only is the Reid Drug Co. case of significance for what it
actually holds with reference to the inherent power of a court of
equity to appoint a receiver for a solvent corporation wherein
182 Id. at 889, 71 S.W.2d at 995.
183 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d 625 (1937).

184 Id. at 531, 105 S.W.2d at 629. The receivership proceedings in this case
grew out of differences between two equally divided factions in the Reid Drug
Co. The two plaintiffs had purchased a one-half interest in the business from
Reid, who theretofore had operated the business as a sole proprietorship. After
incorporation, Reid and his wife owned the remaining one-half interest, and they
The
directorsseems
of theto corporation.
plaintiffs between
became the
the four
along
with the two dinculty
have come from
main sourcehe
two factions
a complaint by the plaintiffs that the business was not showing the profit which
they claimed Reid had promised would be forthcoming when plaintiffs had purchased their interest in the business. Nevertheless, the business was admitted to
be solvent and Reid, who had been made manager of the business, expressed
his confidence that profits could be made if he were left unmolested and
allowed to continue the operation of the business, there having been only about
a five months operating period since the time of the incorporation of the business.
Despite the deadlock which thereby resulted, the court reversed the order of the
trial judge appointing a receiver, on the ground that the allegations of the
petition and the testimony given in the case failed to establish fraud or mismanagement in the conduct of the corporate affairs by Reid justifying resort to such
a drastic remedy in the case of a solvent corporation.
185 On the other hand, when acts of mismanagement accompany dissension
and deadlock, courts may recognize receivership (and liquidation) as an appropriate remedy, even in the case of a solvent corporation. See, for example, Graham
v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 123 S.W. 260 (1909), in which the court upheld the
appointment of a receiver and an order for the sale of the corporate property
where the evidence sustained the charge that the president, as the representative
of one of two equally divided factions in a successfully operated closely held
corporation, had engaged in such acts of mismanagement as to jeopardize the
corporate property and the interests of the opposing faction. See also Adams v.
Farmers Nat'l Bank, 167 Ky. 506, 180 S.W. 807 (1915), in which the court
upheld the appointment of a temporary receiver for a solvent corporation where
there were charges of mismanagement on the part of the directors of the corporation accompanied by internal dissensions among the shareholders and officers of
the corporation.
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deadlock exists but it is also significant for the possible influence
which it may have in the decision of similar cases arising under
the 1952 deadlock statute. As previously indicated, the language
of this statute is permissive-the corporation may be dissolved by
decree of court. In an early Kentucky case involving construction
of a receivership statute, the court said that the language of the
statute that a receiver
"may" be appointed was not equivalent to
"must" be appointed.1 86 If a similar interpretation is given to the
language of the deadlock statute, then a court would be free to
adopt the reasoning of the Reid Drug Co. case when a solvent
corporation is involved and deny dissolution despite the existence
of deadlock.
A Delaware court has already adopted this parity of reasoning
with reference to the Delaware deadlock statute. 8 7 The statute
of that state provides that, upon application of any shareholder,
the Court of Chancery may appoint a receiver (or receivers) for
a corporation whenever, by reason of an equally divided vote of
the shareholders, there is a failure to elect directors and such
failure exists at two successive annual elections. 18 8 In a suit
brought by two sisters, who together owned fifty per cent of the
corporation's stock, against their brother, who owned the other
fifty per cent, the plaintiffs contended that the mere showing of a
failure to elect directors for two successive annual elections because of equal division among the shareholders was itself sufficient
to require the court to appoint a receiver. Defendant challenged
this contention, pointing to the use of the word "may" in the
language of the statute. The chancellor said:
If the appointment were intended to be automatic and not
within the court's discretion there was no reason to use the
permissive word "may" rather than the mandatory "shall."
It will be noticed that under 8 Del. C. § 291, dealing with
the power of the court to appoint receivers for insolvent
corporations, the permissive "may" is employed. This has
been held on many occasions to give the court a discretionary power even though insolvency exists.... By parity
186
McClure v. McGee, 128 Ky. 464, 466, 108 S.W. 341, 342 (1908).
187 Paulnan v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch. 1958).
1884 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,§ 226 (1953). This section grants the same power
to the Court of Chancery if there is a failure to elect directors by reason of an
equally divided vote of the shareholders at an election ordered by the Court of
Chancery under the provisions of § 224 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
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of reasoning, particularly where the drastic receivership
remedy is involved, a bare showing of failure to elect
directors for two successive annual meetings because of

stockholder deadlock is not sufficient to require the court
to appoint a receiver, under the language of the statute. 89
Despite the position thus taken by the Delaware chancellor,
it is arguable that his construction of such statutory language is
not the most desirable as far as the Kentucky deadlock statute
is concerned, since it could result in the deadlock statute adding
little, if anything, to the already existing general receivership
provisions of the corporation statute.
In this connection it is of interest to note that the present New
York deadlock statute contains a specific mandate that a final
order of dissolution shall be made only "if upon the application
for the final order, it shall appear that.., a dissolution will be
beneficial to the stockholders or members and not injurious to the
public."9 0 This restrictive language has resulted in the New York
Court of Appeals refusing to allow a petition for dissolution to be
entertained in the case of a prosperous corporation despite the
existence of allegations of serious and irreconcilable conflict resulting in deadlock.' 9' Commenting on this and other deadlock
statutes, Professor Lattin has said:
Generally, these statutes provide for dissolution without
reference to the matter of whether it will be for the best
interests of the corporation, the assumption apparently being that, in the very nature of things, the continuation of

conditions is in itself
the corporate business under deadlock 92
intolerable and necessarily damaging.
The assumption underlying these statutes which Professor
Lattin speaks of seems particularly appropriate to the Kentucky
statute and points to an interpretation of the statute which makes
dissolution automatic upon a proper showing of the kind of deadlock described by the statute.'93
189 Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272, 273 (Del. Ch.1958).
190 N.Y. Gen Corp. Law § 117.
191
In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954). The
restrictive language which influenced this decision has been deleted from New
York's new Business Corporation Law. See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and
Practice (Appendix, 1961 Pocket Parts, at 112).
192 Lattin, Corporations 560 (1959).
193 See Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389
(1956), for such an interpretation by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin of a clause

(Footnote continued on next page)
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3. Dissolution independently of corporationstatutes.
Turning next to the second aspect of dissolution in the close
corporation, that is, the extent to which the participants may
provide their own criteria for dissolution, it becomes necessary
to consider whether this can better be accomplished, if it can be
accomplished at all, through the use of charter or bylaw provisions
or through the use of an independent shareholders' agreement.
Suppose first that the participants desire to relax the requirements for dissolution as contained in the corporation statutes.
Could they provide in the articles of incorporation or bylaws for
dissolution of the corporation upon application of any one shareholder or stated percentage of the voting shares less than a
majority? There are two possibilities for support of such provisions under the Kentucky corporation statute, neither of which,
however, lends much encouragement to their successful adoption.
The first possibility flows from the section of the statute dealing
with the makeup of the articles of incorporation. After listing
the items of information which must appear in the articles, the
section contains the statement that the "articles of incorporation
may contain any other provisions, consistent with the laws of this
state, for regulating the corporation's business or the conduct of
its affairs." 194 While this is a broadly worded provision, its reliability to support a charter clause giving the minority the power
to force dissolution is weakened for at least two reasons. In the
first place, experience in other states with these broadly worded
statutes sanctioning optional charter provisions has left some uncertainty as to their scope, 195 and secondly, the illusive require(Footnote continued from preceding page)

in the Wisconsin deadlock statute granting courts power to liquidate the assets
and business of a corporation when the shareholders are deadlocked in voting
power and have failed to elect directors for a period which includes at least two
consecutive annual meeting dates. But see the analysis and discussion of the
Wisconsin case and a similar clause in the Oregon deadlock statute in Tackson v.
Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959) (Oregon provision treated
as discretionary). It has been suggested that equity jurisdiction should remain
flexible because of the variety of factual variations which may accompany dissension. 4 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law § 1986, at 361 (1960). To the same
effect see Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1532, 1546 (1960).
194 KRS 271.035(2). (Emphasis added.)
195 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.45 (1958). In a recent article devoted
to rovisions in modem corporation statutes which affect close corporations,
Professor O'Neal comments that "in view, however, of the general repudiation of
the old 'concession theory' of corporate existence as inconsistent with the facts
(Footnote continued on next page)
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ment of 'lawfulness" makes it possible to attack a dissolution provision which relaxes the minimum statutory voting requirement
on the ground that it violates a statutory "norm."9 6 The other
possibility for supporting an optional dissolution provision relaxing dissolution requirements flows from the section of the corporation statute, already considered, which provides that the articles
of incorporation or bylaws may specify the votes that shall be
necessary for the transaction of any business. 9 7 It will be remembered, however, that this provision is prefaced by the clause,
"subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to the vote
that shall be required for a specific action." Since the section on

voluntary dissolution provides that the articles cannot make

provision for less than a vote of a majority of the voting power, 198

these two sections taken together seem to preclude giving to the
minority power in the corporate charter (or bylaws) to force a

dissolution of the corporation.' 99
If a minority is not permitted to call for dissolution by provision in the articles or bylaws, can this be accomplished by a
shareholders' agreement? For example, could an agreement pro-

vide that if any one shareholder requests dissolution all other
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of present-day corporate life and the acceptance of the idea that corporate charters
and codes of bylaws are primarily contracts among the participants in the enterprises, courts are likely in the future to give a consistently broad and inclusive
scope to these statutory authorizations." O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close
Corporations, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 341, 345 (1958).
196 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.49 (1958).
197 KRS 271.315(7).
18 KRS 271.500.
199 Professor Lattin has offered the suggestion that unless the statutes indicate
that dissolution is possible "only" through the statutory processes "there would
seem to be no good reason for a court's failing to support this kind of provision."
Lattin, Corporations 558 (1959). However, another writer, commenting on a
series of provisions in the Kansas corporation statute similar to those in Kentucky,
has said that "the purpose of the Kansas requirement of at least a two-thirds vote
for dissolution would seem to be to protect large minorities from untimely
dissolution," and that "perhaps it would be felt that a provision which required
a majority to accept dissolution at the instance of a minority would be inconsistent
with this intention." Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 405, 442 (1959). Professor Cary, expressing similar doubts
as to the validity under Illinois law of charter provisions permitting any one
shareholder to call for dissolution, has observed that "perhaps it is fitting that a
going concern should not be dissolvable at the whim of one shareholder, although
the question might be raised why the rule should be different from that for
businesses operating as a partnership." Cary, How Illinois Corporations May
Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 427, 438 (1953). It is significant that New York has made provision for
relaxing dissolution requirements in its new Business Corporation Law. See 2
Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Appendix, 1961 Pocket Parts, at 89).
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shareholders will vote their shares for dissolution? Such an
agreement, if entered into by all the shareholders in the corporation, might well be upheld in some jurisdictions, despite the fact
possible infringement on the statutory
that it would involve 200
"norms" for dissolution.
The result is more doubtful as far as
Kentucky is concerned due to the emphasis placed on the inviolability of statutory "norms" in the reasoning of the court in the
Haldeman case,20 ' discussed in connection with voting agreements. Certainly where less than all the shareholders seek to
arrange for one of their number to compel dissolution, the agreement would appear predoomed to failure under the reasoning of
the court in that case. Still another question remains. Even
assuming such an agreement involves all the shareholders and is
otherwise valid, will it be enforced? It is not self-executing and
this once again plunges the entire matter into the welter of
uncertainty which surrounds the enforcement of shareholders'
agreements generally. The draftsman must here again consider
the possible use of an irrevocable proxy arrangement as a means
of assuring enforceability of the agreement. 2
Instead of seeking ways to relax dissolution requirements the
shareholders in a close corporation may wish instead to tighten
such requirements so as to prevent dissolution even by a majority.
This wish may be particularly evident where the shareholders
have arranged for veto powers in each participant, since otherwise
a group of shareholders through use of the dissolution procedure
might be able to circumvent the veto power and thereby freeze
out a minority shareholder against his will. Could the shareholders, therefore, set up a unanimity or high vote requirement
for dissolution in the articles of incorporation to accompany
whatever other veto arrangements they may have made? The sec200 See Leventhal v. Atlantic Fin. Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20
(1944). Hornstein considers the effect of shareholders' agreements to compel
dissolution to be unsettled. Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely
Held Corporation, 59 Yale L.J. 1040, 1047 (1950). Israels adopts a more
optimistic attitude. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 791-92 (1952). The North
Carolina Business Corporation Act specifically recognizes the possibility of private
agreements concerning dissolution (whether or not embodied in the corporate
charter) when such agreements are in writing and consented to by all the shareGen.
Stat. § 55-125(a)(3)(repl. vol. 1960).
holders.
2B N.C. 76
201 See
supra.
202 See note
Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas
Corporation, 7
Kan. L. Rev. 405, 442 (1959).
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tion of the Kentucky statute which sets forth the vote required
for voluntary dissolution is framed in terms of an affirmative vote
of not less than a majority of the voting power.0 3 While such a
provision, as already indicated, seems clearly to prevent "going
down" with the vote requirements, it seems equally clearly to
sanction "going up" with such requirements even to the point of
unanimity. This would probably not prevent a petition for involuntary dissolution on the part of majority shareholders under
the receivership sections of the Kentucky statute, but if the
corporation is solvent and its business profitable, it has been
suggested that under such circumstances a court would likely be
willing to recognize and protect the interests of the minority.0 4
In other words, unanimity agreements such as this probably cannot exclude whatever power a court of equity may feel it has to
investigate the need or desirability for liquidation
in the interests
20 5
of the corporation and all the shareholders.

Whether the requirements for dissolution in any given case
should be relaxed, if possible, or made more difficult is not an
easy question to answer. As observed by Professor O'Neal,
"whether a provision for easy dissolution or a requirement making dissolution difficult will in the long run be more advantageous
to the enterprise and fairer to the participants is almost impossible
to foresee." 200 He indicates that in deciding what advice to give,
about all the lawyer can do is weigh carefully all factors involved,
including the personalities of the shareholders and how
they are
20 T
likely to conduct themselves in the event of conflict.

4. Other relief from deadlock-Arbitration.
The drastic nature of dissolution as a solution for dissension
and deadlock among the participants of a close corporation,
KRS 271.500.
Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation,7 Kan.
L. Rev.
405,
444 (1959).
205
See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 183 (1959). The North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, as adopted in 1955, contained a provision
recognizing the power of a court to liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation and to enter a decree dissolving the corporation in an action brought
by a shareholder when it was established that the shareholders were deadlocked
in voting power and for that reason could not at two consecutive annual meetings
elect successors to directors whose terms had expired. In 1959 this provision was
amended so as to exclude shareholder deadlock of this kind arising "by virtue of
special provisions or arrangements designed to create veto power among the
areholders." 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a)(2)(repl. vol. 1960).
2002 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 9.06, at 175 (1959).
207 Id. at 176-77.
203
204
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particularly when the corporation is prosperous, has led to a
search for other and less severe methods of resolving such strife
when it arises. This search has uncovered arbitration as a possible
deadlock-breaking device. However, the usefulness of arbitration
in this area has been tempered somewhat by the failure of most
present state arbitration statutes to provide for enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes. While the Kentucky
arbitration statute, for example, expressly sanctions the submission
to arbitration, by written agreement of the parties, of "any controversy that might be the subject of an action," 20 8 language such
as this has generally been interpreted as applying only to the
submission of disputes which have already arisen.0 9 Confined
in this way arbitration will not prove too helpful in resolving
disputes over management and policy questions arising among
the participants in a close corporation since arbitration of such
matters to be effective should be agreed upon in advance1
In states, like Kentucky, which have arbitration statutes, common law arbitration is usually also accepted, under which the
parties may establish their own rules for resolving disputes.2 '
However, an agreement to arbitrate future disputes, while valid
under the common law, does not prevent the parties from resorting to the courts if they prefer, such agreements being treated
as revocable until an award has been rendered. 12
New York was the first state to enact a statute broad enough
to encompass future disputes.2 13 This action was taken in 1920.
Since that time some eighteen states have adopted statutory
provisions with language sufficiently broad in scope to permit
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.2 14 How208 KRS 417.010.

209 Sturgis, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 88 (1930). See the discussion of Kentucky law in Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
210 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 9.13 (1958).
211 Sturgis, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 2 (1930). See the following
Kentucky cases confirming that the arbitration statute does not supersede common
law arbitration: Miller v. Plumbers Supply Co., 275 Ky. 647, 122 S.W.2d 477
(1938); Modem Sys. Bakery v. Salisbury, 215 Ky. 230, 284 S.W. 994 (1926);
Gannon v. McClannahan, 204 Ky. 67, 263 S.W. 770 (1924); Paine v. Kentucky
Ref. Co., 159 Ky. 270, 167 S.W. 375 (1914); Thomasson v. Risk, 74 Ky. (11
Bush) 619 (1876).
212 Sturgis, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 45 (1930). For Kentucky
cases, see Kramer v. Cough, 310 Ky. 299, 220 S.W.2d 577 (1949); Jones v. Jones,
229 Ky. 71, 16 S.W.2d 503 (1929).
213 Sturgis, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards 88 (1930).
See N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 1448.
214 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 184, at 230 (1959).
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ever, a 1956 decision of the New York Court of Appeals,21 5 con-

struing the New York arbitration statute, has cast a dark shadow
on the availability of arbitration, even under such statutes, as a

solution to managerial disputes in the close corporation where
unanimity agreements exist.
In that case, one of the principal shareholders in two closely
held real estate corporations sought to have the court require
submission to arbitration of his claim that the other principal

shareholder should be removed from his position as an officer and
director in each of these corporations. Arbitration was sought
under the terms of an agreement between the shareholders, made
at the time the corporations were formed, which stated that
should any "arbitrable controversy" arise between them such con-

troversy was to be settled by arbitration. The court held that
arbitration was unavailable under the New York arbitration

statute until a resolution had actually been adopted by the shareholders ousting one of them from office, since until then there
would be no controversy which could be the "subject of an
action" as required by the statute.216 Such a resolution was not
possible in the case under consideration, however, because the
agreement between the shareholders also contained a provision,
embodied in the charter of each of the corporations, requiring

unanimous vote for shareholder and director action.
This New York decision, if followed in other jurisdictions
having similar statutory language, could interfere considerably

with arbitration as a practical solution for management controversies in the close corporation. However, even if the legal
pathway to use of arbitration as a deadlock-breaking measure
were unencumbered, it would probably still be true that some

management disputes are of such a nature as to be unsuited for
215

(1956).

Application of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898

216 Thepertinent part of the New York statute provided that two or more
persons could submit to arbitration "any controversy existing between them at the
time of the submission which may be the subject of an action, or they may
contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them."
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448. The question has been asked whether, as a matter of
statutory construction, the court needed to interpret the phrase "which may be the
subject of an action" as applicable to contracts to submit future as well as existing
disputes to arbitration. 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 9.14 n.86 (1958). New
York has sought to offset the effects of the Burkim case in its new Business
Corporation Law by authorizing judicial removal of a director for cause at the
suit of holders of ten per cent of the outstanding shares. See 2 Hornstein,
Corporation Law and Practice (Appendix, 1961 Pocket Parts, at 99).
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successful arbitration. Is arbitration, for example, a suitable
solution to a dispute in a closely held corporation which involves
an attempt to remove one of the parties from a corporate office,
thereby depriving him of active participation in corporate affairs?
Or does such a situation more nearly approximate that pictured
by one writer who suggested that when the relationship between
the parties has deteriorated to the extent that removal has been
attempted, a dissolution seems both inevitable and desirable, and
arbitration would only postpone the result?217
A possible solution which Kentucky might consider for the
less serious forms of deadlock in the close corporation is to provide
in its corporation statute for use of a provisional director such as
now provided for in the corporation statutes of California 18 and
Missouri. 19 The California statute provides that when a corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided, so
that business cannot be conducted to advantage or so that there
is danger that the property and business of the corporation will be
impaired and lost, the court may appoint a provisional director
at the request of one-half of the directors or holders of not less
than 33V3 per cent of the stock. It has been said of this approach
that it "is a salutary solution for what might be only a temporary
217 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1323, 1325 (1956). Of interest in connection with this
suggestion is the fact that in the Burkin. case, Burkin, the majority shareholder,
whose removal through arbitration had been sought by Katz, the minority
shareholder, actually instituted a proceeding to dissolve the two corporations.
Katz sought by motion to stay Burdn's application for dissolution pending
a determination of arbitration of certain other matters of disagreement between the parties. The trial judge, however, refused such a stay in light of the
hopeless disagreement and stalemate which existed between them. The judge
pointed to the fact that the parties had been embroiled in almost continuous
litigation since their corporations were formed, and that, ironically, most of such
litigation had been concerned with which disputes were arbitrable and which were
not. Application of Fulton-Washington Corp., 3 Misc. 2d 822, 151 N.Y.S.2d 417
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 987, 157 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1956). The petition
for dissolution was entertained even though the corporations involved continued
to be profitable. The trial judge emphasized that, since the plan of operation of
these two men was to form corporations for the purpose of improving vacant
parcels of real estate, selling these parcels as thus improved at a profit, and then
dissolving the corporations, the situation was quite different from that involved
in those close corporations where the parties contemplated indefinite continuance
of business operations. One writer, commenting on this aspect of the judge's
opinion in relation to the strict attitude of the New York Court of Appeals
concerning dissolution of solvent corporations under the New York deadlock
statute as reflected in the Radom case, offered the suggestion that "whether this
is a valid distinction or not, any relaxation of the prevailing view on this point
is to be welcomed." de Capriles, Corporations,1956 Survey N.Y. Law, 81 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1427, 1432 (1956).
218 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 819 (Deering 1953).
219 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.323 (1959).
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stalemate in an otherwise thriving corporation because it makes
it unnecessary to put the corporation in the hands of a receiver,
even when that is possible," and "thus avoids the danger to a
corporation's business or credit, which a receivership might entail,
while remedying the internal dissension."220
Purchase by one faction of the stock held by the opposing
faction is one way for two groups in disagreement to avoid the
losses that dissolution and liquidation might bring. Indeed, it has
been recommended that majority shareholders be given an option
to purchase the minority interest either as an alternative to or as

an addition to agreements among shareholders providing that
all will vote for dissolution in case of corporate paralysis brought
about by unanimity requirements for corporate action.22 1 Further-

more, statutory provisions exist in at least two states which
recognize this need for protection of majority interests. In
California, for example, which permits one-third of the shareholders to petition for dissolution on certain stated grounds,
including deadlock,222 holders of fifty per cent or more of the
outstanding shares may avoid dissolution by purchasing the
shares of the petitioning shareholders at their fair value. 22 3 The
220 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull., Vol. XXIX-No. 1, July 8, 1959, ff 1.7.
To the effect that the use of a provisional director is of only limited utility, see
Comment, Unusual Statutory Remedies for the Deadlocked Corporation in California: Voluntary Dissolution and the Provisional Director, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 272,
281 (1960), wherein the writer says: "As a remedy for deadlock with a minimum
of disruption to the corporation involved, the advantages of the provisional director
are obvious. . . . [A] provisional director may provide valuable assistance over
rough spots when they are relatively few and far between and the points of
disagreement are sharply defined. But a permanent solution to deadlocks caused
by general disagreement on management policies should not be expected." In
Note, Deadlock and Dissolution in Close Corporations,45 Iowa L. Rev. 767, 780
(1960), the writer points out two weaknesses in the provisional director statutes:
(1) they apply only when there is deadlock in an even-numbered board, and (2)
once the deadlock is broken there is no assurance that the directors will not again
become deadlocked.
221 Cary, How Illinois CorporationsMay Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427, 439 (1953).
222 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. §§ 4650-51 (Deering 1953).
223 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 4658 (Deering 1953). Professor O'Neal comments
that "this buy-out feature is desirable because it permits majority shareholders to
preserve the enterprise as a going business and at the same time guarantees a
dissatisfied shareholder a fair price for his holdings." O'Neal, Oppugnancy and
Oppressionin Close Corporations:Remedies in America and in Britain, 1 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1959). Commenting on the California statutory provisions
for involuntary dissolution and the accompanying buy-out feature, another recent
writer has said: "When a minority stockholder 'is locked in' and the majority are
being unfair to him, as is so often the case in close corporations, what is needed
is some means by which the contending factions can get a 'divorce.' What the
minority needs is some way to get their investment out of the corporation. This
(Footnote continued on next page)

KENTUCKY LAW JOu'NAL

[Vol. 150,

2
West Virginia corporation statute contains a similar provision,
225
which served as precedent for the California provision.
A recent lower court decision in New York illustrates the
practical usefulness of an arrangement whereby one faction can

buy out the other faction.226 The court in that case confirmed an
award by an arbitrator under a shareholders' agreement providing
in broad terms for the arbitration of any differences which might
arise between the parties in the operation of the business. The
arbitrator had devised a plan whereby one faction could (and
might be required to) purchase the stock of the other faction at a
price fixed in the plan by the arbitrators. The court took the
position that, when an arbitration clause is sufficiently broad,
"equitable relief is proper and may be granted by the arbitrators
even though such relief would not be proper if the controversies
between the parties were being determined by a court rather
than by arbitrators."2 27
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has also recognized the usefulness of buy-out arrangements. In the early case of Graham v.
McAdoo,2 2 8 the court, in approving the appointment of a receiver
and an order for the sale of the property of a corporation owned
by two equally divided factions, made the observation "that it is
to the interest of all the stockholders that the corporation should
be dissolved and the property sold, in order that it may be
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

can be accomplished either by an involuntary dissolution or by a majority buying
out the minority at a fair price. It was to provide just such a mechanism that
the above-mentioned sections of the Corporations Code of California were adopted
in 1931." Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. Law.
550, 558 (1961). This same writer also observed that "in discussions with lawyers
dealing with close corporations, they advise that in their opinion those in control
of such corporations are more attentive to the rights of minority stockholders by
reason of the existence of these remedial sections of the California Corporations
Code, and that if an action is commenced under these sections a settlement
satisfactory to both parties is usually reached without the necessity of going to
trial." Id. at 560-61.
224 1 W. Va. Code Ann. § 8093 (1955). Connecticut has an analogous
statute which, however, is not confined to purchase by majority or fifty per cent
interests. 6 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-384 (Supp. 1959). See Sturdy, Mandatory
Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. Law. 550, 561 (1961).
Cumulative
225
Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. Law.
550, 561 (1961).
226 Application of Astey, 19 Misc.2d 1059, 189 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
227 189 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5. Support for the exercise of such equitable powers by
an arbitrator can be found in a decision handed down by the New York Court of
Appeals in the same year. Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160
N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (specific performance of an employment
contract).
228 135 Ky. 677, 123 S.W. 260 (1909).
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purchased by one faction or the other, and thus restore a harmony
in the management which it is evident never can be obtained
while the situation remains as it is now." 229 The court added:
"When the case returns to the circuit court, the chancellor will
doubtless order the sale on such terms as to time as will enable
either party to purchase it if they desire, and this will insure such
an active competition between the factions, and perhaps others,
for the property, as will insure that there will be so sacrifice of it
at the sale."230
OPERATIONAL AcTvrs

1. Formalities.
Not only must the participants in the close corporation cope
with difficult and sometimes frustrating problems in the organization and dissolution of their enterprise but they must likewise be
on constant guard for pitfalls that may confront them in the
active day-to-day pursuit of their business affairs.
Perhaps no phase of their operational activities harbors more
potential trouble for the participants than that pertaining to
formalities required by law in the conduct of their business. The
statutory mandate that the business of a corporation shall be
managed by a board of directors has been construed to permit
229 Id. at 688-84, 123 S.W. at 262.

230 Id. at 684, 123 S.W. at 262-63. Along the same lines, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in the recent case of Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis.
159, 77 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1956), recognized the utility of the buy-out device
when, in directing the appointment of a receiver for, and the liquidation of, a
prosprous business, it approved the suggestion made in the Missouri case of
]-anlan v. Hadlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944, 951 (1950) that in such
case if the opposing shareholder groups could agree upon the sale of the interest
of one group to the other by a plan approved by the court, such should be
permitted. The Wisconsin court added: "Therefore, we recommend that the trial
court devise some plan whereby both the plaintiff trustee and the Fromm group
(considering the latter to constitute a single entity) will be given an opportunity
to submit offers to the receiver for the purchase of the 50 per cent stock interest
of the other, or the interest of the other in the net assets of the business, before
the receiver proceeds with an attempt to liquidate the business." 77 N.W.2d at
396-97. See also Tackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9
(1959), in which the Supreme Court of Oregon seemed to consider the possible
availability of a buy-sell agreement as a factor justifying denial of a petition for
dissolution and liquidation of a deadlocked but prosperous corporation. The court
said: 'We think an equitable adjustment will be reached by denying rather than
granting dissolution in this case. . . . To deny liquidation imposes upon each
party a certain amount of burden and uncertainty so long as their differences
continue. . . . If they can not settle their disagreement, then we think that
denial of relief at the p resent time may well lead to a fairer buy-sell agreement
than the remedy of enforced liquidation, a remedy which might destroy the going
concern value of the plant and give both parties an unduly small return for the
value of their investment." 348 P.2d at 22.
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directors to bind the corporation only when they act as a body.23 1
The basis for this requirement is the assumption that the shareholders are entitled to the advantages which come from combined

discussion and deliberation over a problem. 32 In Star Mills v.
Bailey,233 the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized this "board
action" rule when, in refusing to enforce a promissory note exe-

cuted by a corporate president for lack of sufficient proof of
authority from the board of directors for the president so to
act, it said:
A corporate board of directors must act as a board, in order
to bind the corporation. When a board can delegate a
power and intends to, it should act in an official meeting,
and by its records. If this were not so, unofficial, casual
meetings of the men who constituted the board, and parol
statements thereat, would be the warrant on which would
be bound the stockholders whom they represented. That
is what might have been done by a co-partnership. The law
creating it distinguishes between the two in several particulars, one being the manner of acting. The corporation
being artificial, it can act only in the manner allowed by
234
law.

Expressions such as this are obviously not entirely realistic
when applied to the close corporation, 235 and it is significant,
2312
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 392 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954).
23 2

Ballantine, Corporations § 44 (rev. ed. 1946).
140 Ky. 194, 180 S.W. 1077 (1910).
Id. at 197, 180 S.W. at 1079. In Bastin v. Givens, Adm'x, 170 Ky.
201, 205, 185 S.W. 835, 887 (1916), the court reiterated its position in the
Bailey case when it said that "it is a well settled doctrine that a corporation can
act only through its directors at an official meeting regularly held, and that its acts
can be proven only by the records of such meeting." The vigor with which early
courts applied the board action rule is well illustrated in the Minnesota case of
Baldwin v. Ganfleld, 2.6 Minn. 48 (1879), in which the court declared null and
void a deed signed by all the directors of a corporation despite the fact that the
directors had complied with the wishes of the sole shareholder.
235 A more realistic attitude is reflected in the following expressions by a
New York court in Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 187
N.Y. Supp. 306, 310 (1921):
We must recognize the fact that to a greater and greater degree all business,
great and small, is being brought under the management of corporations,
instead of partnerships; that they are, in perhaps the majority of instances,
conducted by officers and directors little informed in the law of corporations,
who often act informally, sometimes without meetings or even by-laws. To
hold that in all instances technical conformity to the requirements of the law
of corporations is a condition to a valid action by the directors would be to
lay down a rule of law which could be used as a trap for the unwary who
deal with corporations, and to permit corporations sometimes to escape
liability to which an individual in the same circumstances would be subjected.
233
234
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therefore, that the Kentucky court itself has recognized that
exceptions sometimes may be necessary to the "board action"
rule, such as when informality of action by directors is established
through custom and usage or when the directors themselves own
all the stock of the corporation and informally authorize an
executive officer to act or when there has been acquiescence by
28 6
the shareholders in action taken by the directors separately.
Despite this indication of judicial tolerance toward informality

by the Kentucky court, no doubt the wisest course of action to
follow as to matters at least of an extraordinary nature is to insist
upon the proper formalities being adhered to so as to forestall the

possible development of troublesome future litigation.

7

Several of the modem corporation statutes have relaxed the

requirement of formal board action2 38 but, with the exception of
the North Carolina statute,3 9 these statutory provisions are
framed in terms of unanimous written consent. Kentucky has no
such statutory provision, and even in those states that do have
such provisions, it has been pointed out that the provisions are
236 See, e.g., Kozy Theatre Co. v. Love, 191 Ky. 595, 231 S.W. 249 (1921).
Even in the Bailey case, the court had conceded that it was possible for a
corporation to become bound for the unauthorized acts of its officers through
estoppel or acquiescence. In Paducah & Ill. Ferry Co. v. Robertson, 161 Ky. 485,
171 S.W. 171 (1914), the court recognized an exception to the general rule that
all directors are entitled to notice of special meetings where an emergency existed
requiring immediate action and a director who claimed that he had received no
notice of such a special meeting nevertheless appeared at the meeting but left
after learning of the action which was about to be taken. More recently, in Slater
v. Bright, 248 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1952), the court held that whether one corporation had acted as a volunteer in paying the debts of another corporation should
not be decided by adherence to strict formality where the affairs of the two
corporations had been conducted informally and an interlocking relationship of
shareholders and officers existed between the two corporations.
237 See 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 412 n.9 (1959).
238 See, e.g., 4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(g)(Supp. 1960). For a list of
other2 states see 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 412 n.12 (1959).
392B N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-29 (repl. vol. 1960).
The most elaborate
statutory provisions yet drafted concerning informal action by directors (and
shareholders) appear to be those contained in the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, wich Professor O'Neal has predicted "may well set a pattern for
future
legislation.
20'Neal, informal
Close Corporations
§ 8.03, atif:90 (1958). The North
Carolina
provision recognizes
action by directors
(1) Written consent to the action in question
is signed by all the directors
...
and
filed
with
the
minutes
of
the
proceedings
whether done before or after the action so taken, or ifof the board . . .
(2) All the shareholders know of the action in question and make no prompt
(3) The
directors..,
to take informal action and this custom
objection
thereto, are
or accustomed
f
is generally known to the shareholders and if all the directors.., know
of the action in question and no director. . . makes prompt objgction
thereto.
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of limited use and are not
an invitation to ignore all the formalities
0
24
of directors' meetings.

A similar problem of informality arises in connection with
action by shareholders. This may arise in connection with action
which the shareholders themselves have the power to initiate
or with action initiated by the directors which requires the
approval of the shareholders. Here again the general rule requires
group action 241 except as this rule may have been relaxed by
statute or by recognition of informality by the courts. About
one-half the states,2 42 including Kentucky,2 43 now by statute per-

mit action to be taken by shareholders without a meeting provided the shareholders unanimously agree in writing to the action
which is to be taken. Some of these states, like Kentucky, provide
for this relaxation with respect to shareholder action but not in
relation to director action. Since the general management of
corporate affairs rests in the board of directors, the relaxation of
formal action at the shareholder level alone obviously does not
serve completely (or adequately) the needs of the close corpora244
tion. Relaxation at both levels seems preferable.

2. Exercise of corporateauthority.
The fact that all of the participants in a typical close corporation may desire to take an active part in the operation of the
business tends to blur the lines of corporate authority as usually
visualized. The standard operating procedure for corporations
has been described as pyramidal in form, with the shareholders
at the base electing the directors and passing on other major
corporate action, the board of directors at the next level acting
as the policy-making body of the corporation, and the officers at
the top executing the policies formulated by the board. 45 The
participants in a close corporation are not likely to isolate care240

1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull., Vol. XXIX-No. 16, Feb. 3, 1960, 1116.2.

2415 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 1996 (perm. ed. repl. vol. 1952).
242 See 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 138, f112.01-.02 (1960).
243 KRS 271.405.
244 It is of interest that even the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act

makes no provision for informal action by directors. Commenting on such omission

in this Model Act, Hornstein calls attention to the fact that this was a deliberate
omission, especially significant, he says, because of the provision in the Model
Act permitting shareholders to take action by unanimous consent in writing
without the necessity of a meeting. 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice
§ 412, at 509 (1959).
245 Baker & Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 89 (3d ed. unabridged
1959).
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fully the several capacities in which they act, with the result
that when any one of them purports to act for the corporation as
its representative, questions may arise as to the scope of his
authority to bind the corporation by his action. Here, reference
to the law of partnership again proves helpful. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, each partner is considered to be an agent
of the firm for the purposes of its business and each partner is
considered to have apparent authority to bind the firm by acts
246
for carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership.
Since the participants in a close corporation tend to follow a
pattern which is more analogous to that of a partnership than to
that of a publicly held corporation, a strong argument can be
made for applying the partnership rule to the officers of a close
corporation, 4 7 thereby eliminating the customary distinctions
drawn as to the authority of particular corporate officers.248
The most acute form in which this agency problem arises is
in the one-man corporation with its sole owner-operator and
24

6 Uniform Partnership Act § 9.

See 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 8.05 (1958). Professor O'Neal indicates that courts have rather consistently recognized much more extensive powers
in the officers of close corporations than would be generally sanctioned in the
public issue corporation, a result which he commends as consistent with the
nature of the close corporation.
248 The president, because of the fact he is usually made the chief executive
officer of the company, is said by virtue of his office to have authority to act for
the corporation in matters concerning the usual course of the corporation's business.
Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 34 Del. 567,
156 At. 350 (Super. Ct. 1931). However, the law in Kentucky as to the inherent
power of the president to act for the corporation appears somewhat uncertain.
Compare Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843, 218 S.W. 288 (1920), with
Ross v. Eagle Coal Co., 237 Ky. 660, 36 S.W.2d 48 (1931). For a general
discussion of the implied powers of the corporation president see Note, 40 Ky.
L.J. 184 (1952). The Kentucky court has described the secretary as "merely a
ministerial officer who keeps the books and minutes of the stockholders' and
directors' meetings and has charge of the seal of the company." Citizens Dev. Co.
v. Kypawva Ol Co., 191 Ky. 183, 186, 229 S.W. 88, 90 (1921). The court has
similarly referred to a bookkeeper as a mere clerical employe. Main St. Tobacco
Warehouse Co. v. Bain Moore Tobacco Warehouse Co., 198 Ky. 777, 781, 250
S.W. 98, 100 (1923). The treasurer is also usually considered a ministerial officer
whose power does not extend to the execution of promissory notes unless the
corporation confers such power upon him. Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 93
Ky. 525, 20 S.W. 535 (1892). But the corporation may he estopped to deny
authority on the part of the treasurer to execute such notes if he has been held
out by long usage as the officer whose duties included the signing of all corporate
obligations. Trapp v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 101 Ky. 485, 41 S.W. 577 (1897).
The corporation may likewise clothe other corporate officers with authority to
represent it without a formal grant of authority from the board of directors.
Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Goodman, 251 Ky. 754, 65 S.W.2d 990 (1933);
Enterprise Foundry & Mach. Works v. Miners' Elkhorn Coal Co., 241 Ky. 779,
45 S.W.2d 470 (1931); Hall-Watson Furniture Co. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co.,
203 Ky. 90, 261 S.W.883(1924).
247
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immobilized board of directors. One authority has remarked that
"probably a one-man company will be bound by any action taken
in its name and on its behalf which is within the scope of its
express or implied powers, if the act was performed or authorized
by the shareholder-manager." 249 His postulate is that the one-

man company is no proper place for the application of general
manager acts in his own
agency principles since the shareholder
250
interest and for himself alone.

A recurring question as to the scope of authority of corporate
officers has been that pertaining to the bringing of suits on behalf
of the corporation, particularly by the president. Although it
appears that no Kentucky cases have yet been decided involving
this particular question,25 ' two New York decisions illustrate the
somewhat refined distinctions that may be encountered. In the
first of these cases, Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen
Corp.,5 2 the New York Court of Appeals held the president of
plaintiff corporation to be without authority to institute an action
against defendant corporation for breach of contract where the
matter had been submitted to the board of directors of plaintiff
corporation and the board of four members, two of whom were
representatives of defendant corporation, had split evenly on a
motion that suit be brought. The position of the court seemed to
be that, since the bylaws of plaintiff corporation contained no
authority for the president to institute litigation and since under
these bylaws board action required the act of a majority of the
entire board, the president had no authority to bring the suit. In
249 Fuller, The IncorporatedIndividual: A Study of the One-Man Company,
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1873, 1889 (1988). In the recent Kentucky case of Virginia
Collins Coal Co. v. Byrge, 340 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1960), where the evidence showed
that the owner of a majority of the stock in each of three coal corporations had
treated these corporations as if she solely owned them, the court concluded that
the jury was justified in finding that the majority owner had authority to employ
plaintiff Byrge on behalf of the corporations. And in 20th Century Coal Co. v.
Taylor, 275 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Ky. 1954), the court, in treating a corporation bound
by an oral agreement entered into with its president, commented that "while it is
true that ordinarily a corporation only acts through its board of directors, it appears
from the evidence that Mr. Bryant [the president] was in effect the corporation
and that
250 he handled all of its important business."
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company,
L. Rev. 1373 1388 (1938).
51 Harv.
2 51
In Savings Bank v. Benton, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 240, 244 (1859), the court
remarked, in a suit brought against the Savings Bank, that "the president of the
bank, being its chief executive officer, had a right as such to appear and answer
for it, and employ counsel for its defense."
252 298 N.Y. 483, N.E.2d 790 (1949).

CLOSE CORPORATION UNDER KENTUCKY LAW

the second of these two cases, West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau
Realty Corp.,= the court held that a corporate president, who
owned one-third of the stock in the corporation, could institute a
suit in the name of the corporation against the remaining two
shareholders, who comprised a majority of the board of directors,
to protect and preserve the corporation's interest since neither the
bylaws of the corporation nor any action by the board of directors
prohibited the president from bringing such suit. The court
distinguished the Sterling Industries case on the ground that in
that case any presumptive authority the president might have had
to bring suit had been extinguished by the refusal of the board
of directors to sanction the suit.25 4
To meet the problem of deadlock presented by the factual
situation in the Sterling Industries case, the new North Carolina
Business Corporation Act contains a provision that "the president
has authority to institute or defend legal proceedings when
directors are deadlocked."2 5 5 Whether this solution is considered
desirable or not as a matter of policy no doubt depends to some
extent on how one reacts to the statement made by the New York
court in the Sterling Industries case when it said that to sanction
such a suit by the president would in effect change the corporation
statute to read that "the corporation shall be managed by its board
of directors, except in the case of deadlock when it shall be
managed by any director who happens to be president." 56 One
conclusion seems evident. Recognition of such a power in the
president (or any other managing officer) may not appeal to
6 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
In reaching this result the court relied on Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v.
Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E. 2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957) (secretarytreasurer as only active officer held authorized to institute suit against outside
parties charged with converting a portion of the corporation's assets), and Paloma
Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958) (president held authorized to commence arbitration of
dispute under contract containing general arbitration clause). Tudge Froessel,
dissenting in the West View Hills case in an opinion concurred in by Judge
Conway, pointed to the fact that in both the Rothman and Faloma Frocks cases
(as well as in the Sterling Industries case) the directors were evenly split and
corporate management was thereby deadlocked whereas in the West View Hills
case it was clear that the president knew that the two other shareholders opposed
the suit. The two dissenting judges thought that this made the case an even
stronger one against permitting suit than the Sterling Industries case. For a good
review of the New York cases, see Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 159 (1961), written
in specific relation to the implications of the West View Hills decision.
255 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-34(c) (repl. vol. 1960).
256 Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84
N.E.2d 790, 794 (1949) (court's emphasis omitted).
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participants in a close corporation who have arranged for a veto
power over corporate decisions. They may need, therefore, to
augment their veto provisions so as to make it clear that no
officer of the corporation is to have authority to bring suits on
behalf of the corporation without prior authorization by the board
of directors.2 57
3. Executive compensation.
Space limitations prevent expanding more fully on the numerous operational problems which may confront the close corporation but one additional matter deserves mention, even if only
briefly, and that is the matter of executive compensation. In a
close corporation the participants may well depend on the business for their livelihood, and to the extent that they do so depend,
they are likely, as in the case of partners, to seek assurance of
some minimum stated annual salary from the profits of the business. Indeed, the temptation often will be to set the salary of
participants in their capacity as officers as high as possible to
avoid the double taxation on the corporate income which may
result when profits are paid out to the participants in the form of
dividends.
The general rule in corporation law is that the compensation
of officers rests with the board of directors.2 58 However, in the
close corporation the same persons who serve as officers also
frequently compose the board of directors, or at least a majority
of such board, and a dual relationship thereby arises which,
under the accepted fiduciary principles applicable to the director
position, may make vulnerable action taken in setting executive
compensation. 259 The majority of the courts in this country still
adhere to the rule that a contract made with an interested director
is voidable regardless of its fairness unless in the making of the
contract the corporation was represented by a disinterested
quorum and voting majority of its directors. 260 Corporation
See 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull., Vol. XXIX-No. 9, Oct. 28, 1959, IT9.2.
Ballantine, Corporations § 74, at 190 (rev. ed. 1946).
259 5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 2129 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1952).
260 Ballantine, Corporations § 67 (rev. ed. 1946). For Kentucky cases applying this rule to executive compensation, see Carter v. Louisville Ry., 238 Ky. 42,
36 S.W.2d 836 (1931); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky. 838, 171 S.W. 393 (1914).
Applying the rule to contracts generally, see Chilton v. Bell County Coke &
Improvement Co., 153 Ky. 775, 156 S.W. 889 (1913). But see People's State
257
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statutes rarely provide any relief to the participants in the close
corporation from the operation of this fiduciary principle and
courts have been astute to outlaw maneuvers designed to establish
an appearance of compliance with the requirement of a disinterested voting majority.
One such maneuver which has been tried is for the members
of an interested board of directors to split the resolution involving
their salaries into parts so that each director refrains from voting
on his own salary. In an early Kentucky case, Beha v. Martin,261
where the directors did not do this, the court by way of dictum
left the inference that had the directors split the resolution into
separate resolutions for each officer so that each director refrained
from voting on his own salary this might have made the action
effective. 6 2 In 1950, however, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in the case of Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 26 3 flatly rejected this
split-resolution technique, which Professor Ballantine once described as "mutual back-scratching," 6 4 and there is no reason to
assume that the Kentucky Court of Appeals today would allow
such an obvious maneuver to circumvent an established legal
26 5
principle.
If relief from such principle is needed, and a strong argument
can be made that it is needed, not only in the close corporation
but also in the public issue corporation, a better approach would
appear to be the inclusion of a provision in the corporation statute
of the state, as in California, freeing directors' contracts generally
from the rigid requirements of disinterested quorum and voting
majority if such contracts are otherwise found to be just and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Bank v. Jacksonian Hotel Co., 261 Ky. 166, 87 S.W.2d 111 (1935); Enterprise

Foundry & Mach. Works v. Miners' Elkhorn Coal Co., 241 Ky. 779, 45 S.W.2d
470 (1931).

261 161 Ky. 838, 171 S.W. 393 (1914).
262 Id. at 845, 171 S.W. at 396. See also Poutch v. National Foundry & Mach.

Co., 147 Ky. 242, 143 S.W. 1003 (1912), in which the court afrmed the
dismissal of a petition by minority shareholders challenging certain increases in
the salaries of the three corporate officers, who owned a majority of the stock
and who constituted the board of directors of the corporation. The court remarked
that "there was a quorum of the Board without either of appellees voting on his
own increase of salary and none of them did vote in his own case." Id. at 244-45,
143 S.W. at 1004.
263 257 Wis. 13, 42 N.W.2d 144 (1950).
264 Ballantine, Corporations § 74, at 190 (rev. ed. 1946).
265 For other cases elsewhere rejecting this reciprocal voting technique, see
Angelus Sec. Corp. v. Ball 20 Cal. App. 2d 423, 67 P.2d 152 (1937); Wonderful
Group Mining Co. v. Rand, 111 Wash. 557, 191 Pac. 631 (1920).
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reasonable as to the corporation. 26 6 A more limited approach

would be the adoption of a statutory provision directed specifically at the problem of executive compensation as was done in
Wisconsin after the Stoiber decision. To meet the problem posed
by that decision, Wisconsin added a new section to its corporation
statute in 1951 which specifically permits the board of directors
to fix executive compensation despite personal interest.2 7 A
similar provision was added to the Ohio corporation statute in
1955.268 The major difference between these latter statutory provisions and the California provision is that they are limited to
contracts for compensation whereas the California provision applies to directors' contracts generally.
Another possibility for meeting the dual relationship problem,
independently of legislative action, is to include in the articles of
incorporation (or bylaws) a provision recognizing the privilege
of interested directors to be counted to make up a quorum and to
vote on resolutions in which they have a personal interest. Case
authority exists outside of Kentucky which indicates that such a
provision will be upheld even though it may have the effect of
changing the common law rule.269 Of course, if the shareholders
approve action taken by directors in which the directors have a
personal interest, this cures the defect, provided such action is
considered as voidable only, and renders the action valid and
enforceable.2 70 However, if such shareholder approval is by less
than all the shareholders, then as the Kentucky court said in Beha
v. Martin, "a court of equity, on application by the minority
stockholders, will review the reasonableness of the salaries allowed the corporate officers by the directors, with the approval
of the majority of the stockholders, and where it appears that the
salaries allowed, considering the nature and extent of the services
266 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 820 (Deering 1953). The new Business Corporation Law of New York contains a provision of this nature modeled on the California provision. See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Appendix, 1961
Pocket Parts, at 101).
267 1 Wis. Stat. § 180.31 (1959).
268 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.60 (Page's Supp. 1960).
269 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (Ch.
1952), aff'd, 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (recognized right of
interested directors to be counted for purposes of quorum).
270 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations §§ 979, 982 (perm. ed. rev. voL
1947). There is support for the position that interested directors are entitled to
vote as shareholders on the ratification of their action as directors. Ballantine,
Corporations § 71 (rev. ed. 1946). But see 3 Fletcher, op. cit. supra § 983.
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rendered, are exorbitant or unreasonable, will afford adequate
relief, by enjoining the payment of such salaries and adjudging
271
a recovery for the excess over what is a reasonable salary."
CONCLUSION

The aim of the present article has been to discuss the problems
of the close corporation in particular relation to Kentucky law.

Yet it becomes evident that any attempt to portray the status of
the close corporation in Kentucky of necessity drives one to a

comparison and review of the treatment given to such corporations elsewhere. This is understandable since the law of no one
state, legislative or judicial, is likely to be complete enough to
cover or anticipate the variety of legal problems which may face
a corporation from the time of its formation until its ultimate
liquidation. Kentucky is no exception to this condition.
As one writer has observed, "possibly the most serious fault
to be found in the present scheme of things is that extraordinary
reliance must be had upon skilled draftsmanship and that certain
areas of uncertainty cannot be wholly avoided." 27 2 In discussing

trends in the law, this same writer says, "we are witnessing a
process of judicial recognition of the close corporation as an
instrumentality that has ends and justifiable procedures distinguishable from those of the publicly held corporation." 273 But,

he adds, "unfortunately, the noticeable trend of thinking among
the courts is not paralleled by similar legislative action."27 4 In

England special provision has been made for so-called "private"
companies having fifty or less shareholders2 7 and in the United
States there are those who have from time to time urged that
separate legislative treatment be given to the close corporation
in this country.27 6 For the most part, however, the view here
161 Ky. at 844, 171 S.W. at 395.
Scott, The Close Corporationin Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. Law. 741,
759 (1958).
273 Id. at 756.
274 Id. at 757.
275 See Gower, The English Private Company, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob.
535 (1953); McFadyean, The American Close Corporationand Its British Equivalent, 14 Bus. Law. 215 (1958).
276 See, e.g., Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27
Mich. L. Rev. 273 (1929); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation
Law," 28 Cornell L.Q. 813 (1943); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment
of the Close Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 700 (1958).
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seems to be that what is needed is not so much a special statute
for close corporations but a greater awareness within the framework of existing corporation law of the peculiarities of the close
corporation.
To a certain extent this awareness has become
evident. With increasing frequency corporation statutes now
authorize such things as (1) unanimity or high vote requirements,
(2) shareholder and director action by written consent without
formal meetings, and (8) dissolution for deadlock. 278 These developments are helpful but even more in meeting the needs of the
close corporation can be provided for if a real effort in that
direction is undertaken. A good example of such an effort can be
found in the numerous provisions designed to meet the needs of
the close corporation contained in the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act, enacted in 1955.279
Although there is no reason to view with alarm the status of
the close corporation in Kentucky, nevertheless there are some
aspects of its organization, structure, and operation that are
shrouded in uncertainty due to a dearth of judicial decisions, particularly modem decisions, and to ambiguous or fragmentary
treatment of such corporations in the provisions of the general
corporation statute. Perhaps the best approach to removing this
uncertainty and the hazards resulting therefrom would be to
supplement the present corporation statute with provisions that
would clarify existing areas of uncertainty and that would further
free the close corporation from some of the customary restrictions
2 77

See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432, 456 (1956); Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52 Nw.U.L. Rev. 345, 397-413 (1957).
278 See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.14 (1958). Mr. Whitney Campbell,
who for many years has been a member of the Committee on Corporate Laws
of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association, commented as follows on the provisions of the Model Business
Corporation Act prepared by that Committee, in an address he gave to the Utah
Bar Association in 1956 under the title "The Model Business Corporation Act,"
as published in 11 Bus. Law. 98, 104, 106 (July 1956): "I have said earlier that
the model act is not designed for particular application to large or small corporations, but is intended to be equally applicable to the requirements of both the
large and the small incorporated enterprise ....
I think it is clear that a careful
selection and use of the devices available under the model act afford adequate
opportunity to keep the closed corporation closed and to operate it in a manner
quite similar to partnership operation." Special attention has also been given to
the needs of the close corporation in the drafting of the new Business Corporation
Law for New York. See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice (Appendix,
1961 Pocket Parts, at 88).
279 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-1 to -175 (repl. vol. 1960). This act became
effective in North Carolina on July 1, 1957.
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imposed on corporations generally. In that manner a firm legislative foundation at least could be established for the needs of the
close corporation, and this in turn would no doubt have its effect
in encouraging a realistic and tolerant reaction on the part of the
Kentucky courts as cases involving close corporations came before
them for decision. Indeed, a properly constructed corporation
statute adapted to the needs of the close corporation can do much
to reduce the need for litigation over the affairs of these corporations, since much of this litigation in the past has been concerned
with the propriety under applicable corporation statutes of action
taken by the participants in the conduct of their affairs.
The small business enterprise forms an integral part of our
free enterprise system on both the state and national level. The
conception that limited liability is a privilege to be enjoyed only
by business enterprises with large accumulations of capital coming
from many investors has long since been dispelled. Accordingly,
the corporate mechanism should be made flexible enough to meet
the needs of all those privileged to use it.

